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ABSTRACT Vehicles are becoming increasingly intelligent and connected. Interfaces for communication
with the vehicle, such as WiFi and 5G, enable seamless integration into the user’s life, but also cyber attacks
on the vehicle. Therefore, research is working on in-vehicle countermeasures such as authentication, access
controls, or intrusion detection. Recently, legal regulations have also become effective that require automo-
bile manufacturers to set up a monitoring system for fleet-wide security analysis. The growing amount of
software, networking, and the automation of driving create new challenges for security. Context-awareness,
situational understanding, adaptive security, and threat intelligence are necessary to cope with these ever-
increasing risks. In-vehicle security should be adaptive to secure the car in an infinite number of (driving)
situations. For fleet-wide analysis and alert triage, knowledge and understanding of the circumstances are
required. Context-awareness, nonetheless, has been sparsely considered in the field of vehicle security. This
work aims to be a precursor to context-aware, adaptive and intelligent security for vehicles and fleets. To this
end, we provide a comprehensive literature review that analyzes the vehicular as well as related domains.
Our survey is mainly characterized by the detailed analysis of the context information that is relevant for
vehicle security in the future.
INDEX TERMS Automotive engineering, context awareness, context modeling, fleet security, intelligent
vehicles, security, situation awareness, threat intelligence, vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of the ever-increasing networking of electronic
devices with each other and with the Internet, as in the areas
of Internet of Things, Industry 4.0, Smart Grids, Smart Cities,
and Avionics, this development is particularly noticeable in
the automotive industry. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) that
control and monitor their physical environment are becoming
equal components of the World Wide Web, alongside the
traditional personal IT devices and business networks. The
growing interdependence of vehicles is fueled by the intro-
duction of networking standards such as 5G andWi-Fi. Thus,
vehicles connected to the Internet present a prominent exam-
ple of CPS. However, with every little opening of electronic
devices for communicationwith the outside world, the system
is wide open to cyberattacks. Especially with CPS such as
vehicles, hacks and vulnerabilities can have life-threatening
consequences for the users or massive financial implications
for the manufacturers [1]–[3].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Jing Yan .
The automotive industry’s most important problem is to
ensure that fleet-wide attacks cannot take place, or at least
only with minimal consequences [1], [5]. Nobody wants
to imagine a scenario in which a whole fleet of vehicles
is taken over remotely and used as a terrorist weapon, for
example. Less obvious than the physical threat of a fleet-
wide attack, mass theft of vehicles and even the sale of
stolen user data is a problem, since there is a substantial
financial benefit for attackers [1], [6]. Additionally, the in-
vehicle network and the number of vehicle functions are
growing, which manifests, for example, in 150 electronic
control units (ECUs) today and an estimated 300 million
lines of code in 2030 [6], which are required for current
trends such as autonomous driving. Together with the various
external interfaces, e.g. cellular networks, smartphones, Wi-
Fi, Vehicle-to-Vehicle(V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure(V2I),
this constitutes an increasing threat surface and a growing
potential for vulnerabilities. An overview of this ecosystem of
the internal and external networks is shown in Figure 1. For
simplicity, we focus on connectivity in this illustration and
neglect, for example, the sensor technology that is required
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FIGURE 1. The connected vehicle, its internal network, and common security measures. Schematic illustration of the vehicle internal network adapted
from [4]. Car image from Jaguar MENA1, icons from flaticon2.
for autonomous driving (i.e. cameras, radar, GPS, etc.). The
section on the bottom left represents the internal network,
consisting of ECUs of differing performance and several
networking technologies (see Section III-A for more details).
Each rectangular block symbolizes an ECU, and the color
indicates their main networking technology. On the right
side of the picture the external communication of the vehicle
via the aforementioned interfaces is shown. In our example,
the Connectivity Control ECU is responsible to exchange
data with the manifold external communication partners (e.g.
diagnostic, web servers, infrastructure).
Fleets of connected cars shared with multiple users and
operating increasingly autonomously represent a viable target
for hackers. In a recent report [1], KPMG defined a fleet
from a cybersecurity perspective as ‘‘A group of individual
vehicles that connects to a common technology platform
through shared operating systems, software, or hardware’’
[1] With this definition, it becomes apparent that the term
‘‘fleet’’ encompasses even more risks than securing the vehi-
cles of one vehicle manufacturer, for instance ever since
standardized operating systems, e.g. based on the platforms of
the AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open Systems ARchitecture)
foundation [7], have been introduced.
1Jaguar C-X16Design (2011) https://www.flickr.com/photos/56721991@
N06/6213603198, accessed on 2021-03-01
2https://www.flaticon.com/
Having in mind physical and financial impacts, just closing
vulnerabilities and fixing bugs with updates after malicious
incidents is like shutting the stable door after the horse
has bolted and is therefore not a viable solution. Instead,
the cybersecurity solutions of vehicles and fleets should be
(pro)active and react flexibly to the ever-changing threat land-
scape. This includes measures within the vehicle as well as
holisticmonitoring from a central backend. Inside the vehicle,
in addition to well-known measures such as encryption and
authentication, in literature and industry there exist active
monitoring and reaction measures such as firewalls, intru-
sion detection, and intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS)
as well as access controls. IDS for the automotive sector are
currently on the way to standardization, an approach is pub-
lished in version R20-11 of the AUTOSAR standard. On the
other hand, access controls have been part of AUTOSAR
since release R19-11 in the Identity and Access Management
component [8]. In terms of the entire fleet, the elementary
tool is the Vehicle Security Operations Center (V-SOC) [6],
containing measures to correlate and analyze the data with
Machine Learning [9] in e.g. a Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) System, which serves as the
cornerstone of the V-SOC. As an example, some instances
of these measures in the vehicle and backend are shown
in Figure 1 (see Section III-C for more details on the security
measures). In the vehicle, we may find multiple instances
of IDS, firewalls and access controls. The SIEM and SOC
systems are located in a backend server. For a security concept
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for a real vehicle, additional components such as encryption
and hardware security would have to be added, which are not
presented here for simplicity. Securitymeasures in the vehicle
act as security sensors in a network monitoring strategy [10]
that provide the SIEM with log files and events. Security
sensors shall document the actions of and on the system
where they are deployed, e.g. if something suspicious was
recognized. This data is transmitted to the SIEM via the
vehicle’s Internet connection, e.g. via the mobile network.
The recent legal regulation of UNECE makes monitor-
ing and responding to cyberattacks on vehicles and their
ecosystem a mandatory requirement to the homologation of
new vehicle types [6], [11]. This will foster the widespread
adoption of V-SOCs to ensure procedural and technical
capabilities for monitoring and response. According to the
UNECE regulation, a cyber risk management strategy shall
be implemented by the manufacturers to be able to react to
cyber threats and vulnerabilities along the entire lifecycle.
To adhere to the regulations, new standards such as ISO/SAE
21434 [12] will define the common best practices and techni-
cal requirements and serve as the basis for assessing cyber-
security of new vehicles. The technical and organizational
implementation along the value-added chain is of course still
left to the manufacturers and their suppliers.
Both the in-vehicle security measures as well as the SIEM
are responsible for analyzing data, behavior, or software
actions and distinguish between benign and malicious events.
Yet, both the decisions of the onboard measures and the cor-
relation procedures of the SIEM face a severe problem: what
is unusual but harmless, and what is suspicious or an actual
attack depends on the context in which the vehicle or fleet
are situated. To give just one example: a Parking Pilot Sys-
tem (PPS) as well as a Lane Keep Assistance System (LKAS)
in general need to have access to the steering control of the
vehicle. However, the PPS should only be allowed to send
any control to the steering computer on the vehicle-internal
network if we are about to park, whereas the LKAS should
only be allowed to do the same on highways. Holle et al. [13]
mention the increased dynamics of in-vehicle communication
through the introduction of service-oriented architectures,
updates over the air, or function on demand. As a result,
trust boundaries and policies are dependent on the vehicle
context. Static firewalls, for example, will therefore no longer
be sufficient in the future. For service-oriented architectures,
Gehrmann and Duplys [14] argue that an Intrusion Detection
System should support dynamic reconfiguration and rule set
adjustment. Context-sensitive IDS that take into account the
data semantics of onboard networks are seen as a promising
direction, although they have not been given much consider-
ation in research so far [15].
Context-awareness and adaptiveness to situational con-
straints are thus highly compelling capabilities for security
measures. It is not straightforward, though, to specify the
relevant security context of vehicles and fleets, and it is a chal-
lenge to infer the current context and turn it into an instrument
of automotive cybersecurity. To the best of our knowledge,
literature does not provide an overview of context-aware
vehicle security. Furthermore, contextual information is not
yet generally considered as a tool for vehicle and fleet secu-
rity. Only a few publications deal with the integration of
context into tailored solutions, mentioning only exemplary
context information that might be relevant for the specific
application. Given the novelty of context-awareness in this
field, we formulate a definition of the automotive security
context. Our main contribution is to provide a comprehensive
survey of context-awareness for vehicle and fleet security,
taking into account related fields of work such as corporate
IT and various industries. We differ significantly from other
surveys, as this study is intended to be particularly benefi-
cial for the application area of automotive security. Given
the interdependence of corporate IT and the vehicle net-
work, it should be emphasized that we also consider relevant
work on context and security beyond the vehicle ecosystem.
In addition, we define a new taxonomy, that describes the
main categories of information that are context for automotive
security. With this, we aim to pave the way for future research
aimed at leveraging contextual information in security mea-
sures, processes, and tools.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows (see
Figure 2 for a graphical overview of the paper’s organization):
to clarify our contribution’s value, we continue to differen-
tiate our survey from others in Section II and summarize
the necessary background on vehicle and fleet security in
Section III. Afterward, we define the automotive security
context and emphasize the challenges the automotive industry
faces in developing effective and efficient security measures
and why contextual information is crucial for their solu-
tion (see Section IV). This work’s central contributions are
Section V and VI, surveying, summarizing, and comparing
the relevant publications on context-awareness for automo-
tive security purposes. An in-detail analysis identifies open
challenges and research gaps. Finally, Section VII concludes
this paper with a summary and outlook.
II. RELATED SURVEYS
Perera et al. [16] provide an extensive survey for context-
awareness in Internet of Things applications. However, they
only consider context-aware systems’ security and privacy,
e.g. secure data collection and storage and policies to access
context information. Since various personally identifiable
information is contained in the raw data and the abstracted
contextual information, this is an essential component of
context-aware systems. Yet, the usage of context informa-
tion in security measures is out of their scope. The work of
Li et al. [17] also covers security for context-aware systems.
They demand encryption and monitoring of the information
to identify anomalies and unauthorized access. Anyhow, this
field is not the focus of our work and additionally, the afore-
mentioned publications are not aiming at the automotive
industry.
Various publications that provide an overview of auto-
motive security cover different security measures, from
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FIGURE 2. Content and structure of this work.
specific hardware as a root of trust to encryption, intru-
sion detection and prevention systems, firewalls, and
resilient architectures [15], [18]–[22]. But none of these
mentions context-awareness of the measures, except for
Al-Jarrah et al. [15] (see Section V-B). [15] and [18] focus
on surveying Intrusion Detection Systems, while [19]–[22]
provide a broader overview of security measures. Publica-
tions [21], [22] discuss several security measures and also
methods that affect back-end vehicle connectivity, but are
not a survey intended to provide a comprehensive review
of related literature. In comparison to [19], publication [20]
remains limited to the topic of updates in the area of fleet
security. In contrast, our work surveys context information
for both the fleet and the in-vehicle defense mechanisms and
includes publications from the IT and IoT domains.
The survey of Vahdat-Nejad et al. [23] provides an
overview of context-awareness in vehicular networks.
Although they discuss VANETs (Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETworks), which require vehicles with external V2V
interfaces, the word security is not mentioned. Fernandez-
Rojas et al. [24] present the most recent study on vehicle
context-awareness, and it includes a section on security
and data management. As such, their work is valuable for
comparing it to ours. The section on security, though, does not
contain works that are specifically targeted at the automotive
industry. We defer to their work for a broader overview of
context-awareness for vehicles, while we look specifically at
the area of security for automotive systems.
TABLE 1. Comparison of related surveys with our work. •: Work covers
this topic, ◦: Work covers this topic only partially.
In summary, our work differs in essential aspects from
previous work (see Table 1). Work that covers the breadth
of automotive security measures has so far not sufficiently
addressed the topic of context-awareness, where we make a
decisive contribution. Work on context-awareness has so far
only partially dealt with vehicles or their security. We take up
the essential preliminary work and use it to supplement the
selection of the work considered here.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY
New demands on the vehicle, such as automated driving func-
tions, are driving growth in software, processing capacity, and
networking. We present the internal and external networks
main components in Section III-A. However, we focus on
the network technologies, interfaces and ECU platforms and
omit details on e.g. vehicle sensors and automated driving
functions, which are already captured in a vast amount of
literature, e.g. [25], [26]. With networking and increasing
functionality, the risk for attacks increases, which manifests
in the steadily growing numbers (see Section III-B). For this
reason, various defense measures are the subject of research
in the automotive sector (see Section III-C).
A. THE CONNECTED VEHICLE
In Figure 1, an exemplary Electrical/Electronical (E/E) archi-
tecture of a future vehicle and its connections to external sys-
tems are shown. The E/E architecture consists of the various
ECUs, the operating systems and software running on them,
and the different bus and network systems that interconnect
the ECUs.
1) INTERNAL NETWORK
The most relevant bus system technologies are Con-
troller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Net-
work (LIN), FlexRay, Media Oriented Systems Transport
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(MOST), and Automotive Ethernet. Each technology has
its specific application areas, which differ in terms of
required data rates and the need for real-time guaran-
tees. To name some examples, CAN supports data rates
of up to 1Mbit/s (High-Speed CAN), 5 − 8Mbit/s(CAN-
FD) and 10Mbit/s (CAN XL). With Ethernet, data rates
of 10Mbit/s (10BASE-T1S [27]), 100Mbit/s (100BASE-
T1 [28]), 1Gbit/s (1000BASE-T1 [29]) and even more are
possible. Along with the higher bandwidth offered by Eth-
ernet networks, the physical transceivers’ cost is higher, and
more processing power is required on behalf of the ECUs.
In current vehicles, multiple instances of each of these tech-
nologies can be used to achieve an optimum of cost and
required data rates. For example, the E/E architecture of a
2019 Audi A8 consists of seven CAN buses, one MOST bus,
and one FlexRay [30], besides numerous LIN buses.
Future architectures, such as the one in Figure 1, will make
greater use of Ethernet that replaces former bus systems [31],
[32], leading to convergence with traditional hierarchical
IT networks. To cope with the growing number of func-
tions, service-oriented communication is increasingly used,
which is mainly implemented via Ethernet using the Scalable
Service-oriented Middleware over IP (SOME/IP) [33] and
Data Distribution Service (DDS) [34] protocols. In contrast to
the previous so-called signal-oriented communication, which
is mainly used via CAN, LIN, and FlexRay, the communi-
cation patterns are no longer statically defined at develop-
ment time. Instead, a network is built up dynamically via
service discovery, in which new communication paths can
emerge at any time while others are discarded. Concerning
the ECUs, the trend towards autonomous driving and connec-
tivity leads to centralization and more performant computing
platforms [4], [35]. For example, a central computing cluster
and an I/O cluster are introduced in Figure 1. Whereas many
ECUs for individual tasks were connected via gateways in
the past, the focus here is on general-purpose computing
platforms that can provide several functions.
In our example, the ECUs in the infotainment and body
domain are connected via CAN or LIN to the I/O cluster
because infotainment and body functions are mostly user I/O
driven with low data rates. Hence, the cheaper CAN / LIN
is preferred to Ethernet. Traditionally, functional domains
(chassis, driver assistance (ADAS), infotainment, body) were
physically separated via different buses for the domains.
While in our example this separation still exists, in Ethernet
networks alternatively a virtual separation via a different
Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tag for each domain is
possible. Operating systems such as the POSIX-based (i.e.
Linux) AUTOSAR Adaptive, AUTOSAR Classic, Android
Automotive3 or GENIVI4 running on powerful ECUs support
the general-purpose platform approach. As with bus systems,
operating systems have different application areas that vary
3https://source.android.com/devices/automotive/
4https://www.genivi.org/
in required real-time capability, safety, the scale of software,
and user interaction.
2) EXTERNAL NETWORK
For the outside world, the external interfaces connect the
vehicle to other cars, the user’s smartphone, or home. Dif-
ferent protocols are used for wireless communication within
the external ecosystem. In addition to the cellular 3/4/5G
network, Wi-Fi is a vital interface to connect the car to
backend servers on the Internet ultimately. The market for
backend platform providers is still very new and not yet
consolidated. Large IT enterprises, for example, offer their
cloud services and join forces with corresponding technol-
ogy partners, such as Microsoft and Volkswagen, for inte-
gration into the vehicle ecosystem [36]. For communication
with other cars and infrastructure Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC) or Cellular V2X (C-V2X) are used.
The Onboard Diagnostic (OBD) interface is used to connect
mechanics in the workshop to the car to conduct fault diag-
nosis of the vehicle or perform software updates.
B. THREATS AND ATTACK IMPACTS
The risk of cyberattacks is increasing with the evolution
toward autonomous, connected, and shared vehicles con-
trolled by software. A variety of attacks and potential threats
to the entire ecosystem have been carried out by both
white-hat and black-hat hackers (i.e., criminals with mali-
cious intent). In general, the number of attacks has increased
in recent years [37]. The main risk for cyber incidents orig-
inates from the external interfaces through which attackers
can gain access to the vehicle. From there, further compro-
mises can be made via the internal network. The CAN bus
as an in-vehicle network vulnerable to e.g. spoofing, replay,
fuzzing, and denial-of-service attacks [38] as CAN does not
bring inherent security features. Newer technologies such as
Ethernet and service-oriented software architecture pose new
risks to vehicle security [20], [39], [40]. Furthermore, with
standardized hardware, software, or operating systems (e.g.,
AUTOSAR, Linux-based systems), the potential for attacks
to affect diverse vehicles is exceptionally high. Sensors can be
fooled by manipulated data or jamming as another example,
e.g. the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) or blinding
a camera [41]. With the advent of Machine Learning for
automated driving, adversarial attacks against the automated
driving systems are on the rise. Using some physical stickers,
some systems can be fooled to misclassify street signs [42].
Other researchers demonstrated an attack against the object
tracking system [43]. In addition, manufacturers’ servers are
hackable from the vehicle side if the attacker gains access to
a car’s telematics control unit [44]. Finally, every single line
of code carries the risk of creating new vulnerabilities [6].
The disclosed vulnerabilities and attacks on BMW
(14 remote and local vulnerabilities) [45], Tesla (remote con-
trol of e.g. brakes) [46], or Honda [47] show that almost no
vehiclemanufacturer hasmanaged to leave unscathed. Highly
valuable are theft of consumer data, theft from multiple
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vehicles at once, and attacks that threaten physical security
and thus could be exploited for terrorism or extortion [1].
By attacking to manipulate automated driving functions, for
example, hackers can gain control over a vehicle’s physical
behavior [3]. Ultimately, this can have safety-critical conse-
quences for occupants and the surrounding environment.
C. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
In the automotive ecosystem, different assets need to be
secured, e.g. the applications running in the vehicle and on
backend servers, the communication on the network, and
the hardware (i.e. the ECUs) themselves. Depending on the
asset type, typically different security measures are used.
For more detail on the specific solutions please refer to the
literature [15], [20], [40], [48]–[50].
1) FLEET/BACKEND
The broadest countermeasures are actions that are executed
in a backend server of the manufacturer or a third-party
provider. The data from the entire fleet can be collected and
analyzed here. Typical actions include correlations of events
by the SIEM, the detection of outliers on the level of fleet
data (misbehaving and anomalous vehicles), and the over-
arching V-SOC where all activities are coordinated. After
identifying an incident, Software updates over the air (SOTA)
are deployed fleet-wide to fix vulnerabilities or to improve
the vehicle’s configuration. Alongside monitoring and secure
updates, vulnerability and risk management processes sup-
port fleet security throughout the entire lifecycle.
2) EXTERNAL INTERFACES
The most important aspect is to reduce the number of
interfaces as much as possible without neglecting customer
needs. In addition, applications that are allowed to commu-
nicate vehicle-externally must be restricted in their access to
onboard networks and applications. Diagnostic access should
be secured to a particular degree, as diagnostics bring per-
mission to perform hazardous operations (e.g. flashing new
firmware).
3) APPLICATIONS
The secured operation of applications is ensured with mea-
sures such as access control mechanisms to grant or deny
actions on resources (e.g. execute other applications, read or
write files), and isolate applications in different execution
environments with separated OS. Applications can also be
secured with Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems that
observe and monitor applications and the OS of an ECU.
Detected deviations from normal behavior could indicate the
execution of uncommon system functions.
4) NETWORK
The vehicle’s network can be secured with different mea-
sures. First of all, communication with different safety
criticality and disparate customer functions (e.g. body and
comfort vs. powertrain) should be separated into different
physical or virtual networks. In addition, firewalls enable
blocking any communication on a network based on a set
of predefined rules, both vehicle-internally as well as via
external interfaces. Lastly, Network-based Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems identify deviations of the communication from
the expected behavior of a network and are thus crucial for
detecting CAN or Ethernet security incidents.
5) DATA
Encryption and authentication mechanisms are the major
elements for securing the data. Here, common mechanisms
to authenticate CAN communication (i.e. Secure Onboard
Communication (SecOC) [51]) and to encrypt and authenti-
cate Ethernet communication (e.g. IPSec, TLS, DTLS) are
relevant. CAN communication is typically not encrypted
because the computational overhead is too significant for
low-cost microcontrollers.
6) ECU & HARDWARE
The innermost defenses are hardware security measures and
procedures to manage the keys that are required for authenti-
cation or encryption. The roots of trust are tamper-proof mod-
ules of microcontrollers that provide the hardware for e.g.
encryption and storing of keys on that ECU [19]–[21]. Based
on this hardware anchor firmware code such as the bootloader
and the update mechanism are authenticated and maintain
a chain of trust with secure boot and secure update [52].
Another hardware measure is sensor redundancy. Although
this is more considered as safety measure, redundant sources
of information are also helpful when one sensor is attacked
(e.g., jammed or blinded).
7) EXAMPLE SETUP
In our example (see Figure 1) we highlight some positions in
the E/E architecture and the backend systems where security
mechanisms could be deployed. For example, it makes sense
to control network traffic to the outside of the car with a
Firewall. Intrusion Detection Systems are integrated where
important applications are running (e.g. safety-critical func-
tions such as the powertrain) or where network data can be
easily captured (e.g. a switch). Access control is essential in
the connectivity controller, where e.g. diagnostic access to
the car is handled. Hardware roots of trust, authentication,
and encryption mechanisms are not shown in the example for
simplicity.
In the backend, a SIEM and V-SOC system could be
run on a server of the manufacturer or external servers.
Regardless of where the systems run, the data of the fleet is
collected and analyzed in the SIEM / V-SOC. A schematic
overview of the analysis process in the SOC using the SIEM
system is shown in Figure 3. While the assets, concrete
rules, and actions are different between IT security and
automotive (fleet) security, the workflow and structure of
SIEM and SOC are likely to be reused, see e.g. [53]. First,
the events that are sent or pulled from the fleet are trans-
formed to a common data format, if necessary. The collection
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FIGURE 3. Schematic overview of a SIEM system as part of a SOC.
process also includes persistent storage of the events to make
them searchable for the analysis processes, for example in
a database. Correlation in a SIEM ranges from aggregation
of frequently occurring events, counting common attributes,
e.g. IP addresses, to hand-written if-then rules, to machine
learning-based alerting. The correlation process can involve
additional information, such as known vulnerabilities or com-
mon attack patterns (see also following Section IV). Correla-
tion is used to prioritize events and alert analysts in the SOC,
who access the data through a user-friendly interface, such
as graphical dashboards or tables. An alert triggered by the
SIEM can be analyzed by multiple layers of (human) analysts
in the SOC [54], [55]. If the analysis requires more time or
knowledge, the alert is pushed to a higher level. Hence, at the
lowest level, all alerts are continuously monitored, while the
higher-level analysis should be done by automotive experts
who investigate the critical cases. Then, for known incidents,
a series of predefined actions are taken to address the incident.
In the coming years, the more common case will be that the
incident is unknown and an individual response to the inci-
dent needs to be developed. The actions that are taken in such
cases are not clear today but could span from informing the
vehicle in minor cases to e.g. blocking the vehicle’s internet
connection [55], [56]. Often, an over-the-air update of the
vehicle’s software to eradicate the problem or vulnerability
will be required. However, it must be ensured that an update
does not jeopardize the safety of the vehicle [57]. Finally, new
SIEM rules that capture the detected incident can be added
to the correlation process to facilitate analysis of similar
incidents in the future.
IV. SECURITY CONTEXT OF VEHICLES AND FLEETS
Context and context-awareness are initially abstract concepts
that have to be tailored to our automotive applications. Since
context-awareness has not yet well established for security
in the automobile, we initially formulate a terminology. The
term context has been defined various times, and the most
popular definition of Dey and Abowd [58]
‘‘Context is any information that can be used to
characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a
person, place, or object that is considered relevant
to the interaction between a user and an application,
including the user and applications themselves.’’
is still valuable. To elaborate on this, the entities of auto-
motive security context span - by no means exhaustive -
from the ECUs, data, and network of the car to its functions,
the environment it is situated in up to the vehicles themselves,
threats, and vulnerabilities. Likewise, we will follow a defini-
tion given by Jovanovikj et al., who refined Dey and Abowd’s
definition to introduce the term security context: ‘‘Security
context is a set of contextual information considered relevant
for the process of security, regarding a particular task or
activity.’’ ([59]) Further on, Gartner defined context-aware
security: ‘‘Context-aware security is the use of supplemental
information to improve security decisions at the time they are
made, resulting inmore accurate security decisions capable of
supporting dynamic business and IT environments.’’ ([60])
Closely related to context-aware security is the term cyber
threat intelligence (CTI), defined e.g. by RobMcMillan [61].
Context information about the (enterprise or vehicle) network
assets forms a part of threat intelligence. However, the scope
of CTI is more focused on knowledge that is not originat-
ing from enterprise-internal sources, but external sources
like social media or publications. The goal of CTI is to
link indicators of compromise with specifically known threat
actors (i.e. ‘‘hackers’’) and their typically used methods.
In addition, it is not exclusively technical information, but
also gives e.g the SOC manager or security architect a bird’s
eye view of the security situation. First CTI providers and
information sources for the automotive industry are arising,
e.g. the Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Cen-
ter (AUTO-ISAC) [62] or Upstream Security’s AutoThreat
feed [63]. These sources provide valuable context on ongo-
ing or successful attacks for the entire fleet. The necessity
of context-awareness concerning this external context will
increase in the future with the rise of new threat actors, but we
also elaborate here on internal context-awareness, aiming at
a situational understanding of the vehicle and fleet security.
Based on the aforementioned definitions, we define context-
aware automotive security as
the use of contextual information to improve the
security decisions at the time they are made, result-
ing in more accurate, efficient or timely security
decisions capable of supporting dynamic automo-
tive vehicle and fleet environments.
A. CHALLENGES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY
MEASURES OF VEHICLES AND FLEETS
As already included in our definition, context-awareness is
required due to the dynamic environment and because accu-
rate, efficient, and timely decisions are crucial for automotive
security. Some of the inherent challenges of vehicle and
fleet defense were stated by Mercedes-Benz [64]. In his
talk, Guy Harpak outlines the fleet’s scale and dynamics,
the strict requirements on remediation time, and the diversity
of car types as the key challenges. To give more emphasis,
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we outline some of the major challenges the industry faces in
developing security measures for vehicles and fleets.
A) First of all, a vehicle can be exposed to an unlimited
variety of situations and environments during its life
cycle. Though the manufacturer does not know what
users will do with their vehicles in advance, security
must be guaranteed in all these situations.
B) Secondly, new vulnerabilities and incidents can mani-
fest themselves throughout the entire life cycle. Given
the potentially devastating consequences of a successful
attack, the time required to resolve known issues must
be as short as possible, up to a real-time response in
the vehicle if a successful attack is highly probable.
The sale and exchange of successful attack methods
and tools amongst criminals increase the risk posed by
vulnerabilities to fleets.
C) Thirdly, the volume of functions and software applica-
tions executed in a vehicle causes a massive expansion
of in-vehicle networking. Powerful computers with stan-
dardized operating systems and a wide variety of bus
systems and protocols are required for such a develop-
ment. Security measures must cope with this tangle of
different data and interpretations.
D) At the same time, users expect security to be pro-
vided ‘‘in-kind’’, making it difficult to justify additional
customer costs. Accordingly, development efforts for
in-vehicle security measures are aimed at tying up as few
hardware and software resources as possible, since this
does not bring in a significant profit for the manufac-
turer.
E) About SIEM and V-SOC, the amount of potential data to
be analyzed poses a particular challenge. With millions
of vehicles on the road, it is expected that there will be
many alarms and incidents. Satisfactory prioritization
of the analysis of security incidents is already difficult
in business IT. This is all the more true for the auto-
motive industry. It is impossible to collect and store all
available raw data from the vehicle’s sensors, network,
and computing units in a central instance. Moreover,
data protection and privacy reasons make it difficult to
analyze or store raw data from vehicle fleets.
F) Finally, a fleet consists of different vehicle types and
variants. No vehicle from one manufacturer is the same
as another. In addition, software updates and on-demand
functions increase the number of variants and configura-
tions over time. However, security solutionsmust be able
to copewith all these factors and consider the risks posed
by third parties’ external services (maps, car sharing).
The effectiveness of the security measures applied must be
guaranteed for all situations and be prepared to deal with the
challengesmentioned above. A central aspect for this purpose
is the knowledge about the security situation of the individual
vehicle and the fleet. Security measures both within the vehi-
cle and in the backend require an understanding of the vehicle
situation, the vehicle network, the functions, weak points,
environment, vehicle configuration, etc. to be able to react
adequately according to the situation, since what is normal or
permitted behavior depends on the context.
B. BENEFITS AND USE CASES FOR CONTEXT
Summing up the aforementioned challenges, it depends on
the (security) context, what our security measures should
do. To secure vehicles and fleets effectively and efficiently,
the respective security measures, tools, and processes must be
provided with relevant contextual information. Thus, provid-
ing context information means making the required knowl-
edge about the environment, situation, status, and landscape
generally accessible to all security components. By turning
context into a tool of automotive cybersecurity, significant
benefits can be achieved. We enable security measures to:
1) Understand the situations and react accordingly
2) Bring semantic meaning to the in-vehicle network and
fleet data
3) Uniformly access contextual information across the
entire brigade of security measures
4) Match the relationships between alerts and events, vul-
nerabilities and attacks
5) Reduce the scale of fleet data for analysis and the data
transferred for security purposes from vehicles to the
backend
As a result, context-aware and intelligent security measures
can be developed. In the vehicle, adaptive security is pos-
sible, which flexibly adjust its decisions to their environ-
ment based on the contextual knowledge provided. In the
backend, the context-awareness manifests as a more intel-
ligent analysis of security events and incidents, correlating
security events with fleet behavior, in-vehicle network data,
or vulnerabilities.
To elaborate on this, let us have a look at some primary
use cases of security context, as outlined by Sinha et al. [65].
They mention the configuration of security measures,
the placement of security measures in the network, and the
modification of the measures themselves as the key concepts
for the use of context information. Benefits 1) and 2) are
linked to the configuration aspect. With an understanding of
situations, network and vehicle type differences, the thresh-
olds of an IDS system, the rules of a firewall, or the attributes
of an access control system can be configured and adapted
to fit the context. Benefit 3) is associated with modification,
since the security measures do not need to infer context
on their own but can rely on provided context. However,
benefits 4) and 5) go beyond the key use cases mentioned
by Sinha et al. [65]. Thus, we opt to add analytics as another
main use case. In 4) and 5), context information serves as rel-
evant threat intelligence for the processes and tools involved
in monitoring the entire fleet and reduces the analysis efforts.
As security is a relatively new challenge to the automo-
tive domain but will become a new dimension of quality in
vehicles [6], also modification and placement are use cases
for context information. The optimization of the monitoring
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strategies of the vehicle network and closing the loop with the
development of mature software and appropriate and efficient
security measures are potential applications.
C. CONTEXT MODELS
According to Dey and Abowd, the above definition of con-
text, similar to other definitions, leaves a lot of room to define
what is context information and what is not. Usually, for the
individual use case, a selection of information must always
be made, which is considered context information. The set of
selected information is called the context model, according to
Henricksen’s definition [66]:
‘‘A contextmodel identifies a concrete subset of the
context that is realistically attainable from sensors,
applications and users and able to be exploited in
the execution of the task. The context model that
is employed by a given context-aware application
is usually explicitly specified by the application
developer, but may evolve over time.’’
This selection can be specified more or less formally.
We distinguish here between implicit and explicit context
models (see also [16], [67]). Implicit models are only defined
within a specific application and the identification of the cur-
rent context takes place within the application. An example
for vehicle security would be if the firewall subscribes to
the required raw data like the vehicle speed and draws its
own conclusions about the context like fast, slow or standing.
In contrast, an explicit context model is defined outside the
application and the derivation of the current context takes
place outside. For the firewall in our example, it is not appar-
ent where the context information fast originates from, it is
only made available to the firewall.
This approach’s advantage is that an explicit context model
provides a clear separation of the utilization of context infor-
mation and the definition of the relevant information and its
derivation. Furthermore, the context can be made available
to several applications simultaneously and uniformly. This
is particularly advantageous concerning the configuration of
several security measures. If, for example, firewall and IDS
both use the speed as raw information to derive the context
fast and slow therefrom, conflicting configurations of the
overall vehicle security can occur if each application uses its
implicit context model. On the other hand, it can be disad-
vantageous for the system’s performance to use an explicit
context model, because the access to the context information
is carried out via a communication medium or middleware
instead of within the application [16].
D. CONTEXT MODELING METHODS
For the specification of explicit context models, various
methodologies exist in the literature and multiple surveys
provide an extensive overview of these context modeling
methods [16], [17], [68]–[71]. In general, any method for
describing available information, data, and its relationships
can serve as a context modeling method. The context can be
FIGURE 4. ECOPPA ontology of Hoda et al. [72].
modeled from a general perspective or application-specific.
Although generic models help to get an idea of the univer-
sal categories that are understood as contextual information,
an application-specific model is required to use contextual
information. To give an example, Hoda et al. present in
their paper [72] the ECOPPA ontology for modeling the
context of pervasive computing applications to improve the
system users’ physical activity. Here the authors show how
they derive an application-specific model from a generic one
(upper layer vs. domain level in Figure 4). While location is
generally important for different applications, only specific
locations are actually of interest for each application.
We summarize the most important modeling methods key-
value based, markup language, relational, object-oriented
and ontological. In contrast to other studies, we refrain from
including graphical models here, because although they are
well suited for developing a context model, they still require
some implementation to be used in applications. The imple-
mentation is always a specific data structure that can be
filled with the current context information at runtime, which
can be accessed and queried to retrieve and use the infor-
mation. Accordingly, a graphical model is a helpful way to
achieve one of the realizations described below. For example,
the Unified Modeling Language (UML) or specific tools can
be used to create graphical models. For ontologies, Protégé5
is very often used as a modeling tool. However, there are
several other modeling tools, e.g. Enterprise Architect, which
supports both UML, XML schemas, and ontologies based
on the UML extension Ontology Definition Metamodel.6
Additionally, we briefly describe how the context models can
be persisted, depending on the technology.
1) KEY-VALUE MODEL
Key-value models are the simplest form for context descrip-
tion. For this purpose, we define a list of relevant infor-
mation, which are the keys. During runtime, the values are
accessed like a dictionary. The enumerated attributes (keys)
are easy to design and retrieve. However, no structure,
hierarchy, or relationships can be modeled. This means
that no meta-information about any context attribute (e.g.
5https://protege.stanford.edu/
6https://www.omg.org/spec/ODM/
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uncertainty, time) can be captured. In addition to stor-
ing key-value data in proprietary file formats, key-value
databases could be used to persist context information. In the
automotive sector, the persistent storage of both key-value
pairs and files similar to a desktop PC file system is cov-
ered by the AUTOSAR adaptive standard and can there-
fore be used by applications without significant development
effort [73].
2) MARKUP LANGUAGE
A context model based on the markup language is a
machine-readable document that delivers structured con-
tent. The content here is the context information, which
is hierarchically structured. The markup part of the doc-
ument makes it machine-readable. The most important
form for our use case is the XML (extended markup lan-
guage) format. Here, a schema defined at development time
ensures the validation of the document format and, in part,
the value ranges of the data. Compared to key-value stor-
age, schema validation and hierarchization are advantageous,
while relationships and reasoning are not supported either.
The XML format is primarily useful for persistent storage
as files and for exchanging and transferring data between
applications (e.g. [74]).
3) RELATIONAL MODEL
Relational models originate from the development of rela-
tional databases. Data is thereby described as tables (rela-
tions) of several attributes. Each tuple of a relation has a
unique identifier. Several relations can be connected by defin-
ing an additional relation for their dependence. Hierarchical
relations can be represented implicitly as well, so a relational
database has a higher expressiveness than an XML notation.
For querying the data, standardized languages e.g. SQL exist,
which increases the usability. Although relational models
were not typically considered a tool for contextual model-
ing, they are considered here, since several methods treated
as graphical modeling in other publications can be mapped
to a realization as a relational database. These include, for
example, object-role models and entity-relationship mod-
els. The implemented databases follow a previously defined
schema, which on the one hand allows validation, but on the
other hand, makes it difficult to extend. Relational databases
are industrially established, the development procedure is
well-known and efficient implementations are available for
embedded systems.
4) OBJECT-ORIENTED MODEL
Object-oriented modeling techniques are well known in the
automotive industry, especially since there are established
tools andworkflows for graphical development, e.g. the struc-
tural class and object diagrams of UML. Class diagrams and
object orientation use hierarchies and relationships, which are
very important for context modeling. Since object orientation
is closely linked to programming languages, the implemen-
tation and integration of context objects are straightforward.
However, there is no standard high-level query approach,
so contextual security mechanisms require more effort to
access the context information. Nevertheless, no additional
time delays are expected when accessing the information in
a context object, as is the case with a database query. For
persistence, there are object-oriented databases or methods
for the serialization of files, e.g. JSON.
5) ONTOLOGICAL MODEL
Ontologies are synonymously called ’vocabulary’ and are
the cornerstone of the so-called Semantic Web.7 They are
a semantic model of the terms of a particular applica-
tion domain and contain the terminology and their rela-
tions among each other. The elementary construct on which
ontologies are based are triples of subject, predicate, and
object, e.g., the car (subject) is (predicate) fast (object), thus
representing an annotated connection between two terms.
These triples follow the RDF standard and can be stored in
various machine-readable formats. To differentiate the terms
and resolve ambiguities or draw automatic conclusions from
terms, logical languages exist to extend the RDF standard,
such as OWL. All standards are managed by the W3C. For
context modeling, ontologies are seen as quasi-standard in
different publications. In addition to the automatic inferences
already mentioned, the uniform and consistent definition of
terms, independent of data sources, and the reuse of already
publicly available vocabularies for various areas are of par-
ticular interest to us. For the automotive sector, for example,
the VSSo ontology exists (see Section V-C ). A disadvan-
tage for the automotive industry is that the methodology
comes from the academic and scientific world and there-
fore engineers have little experience in its use. In addition,
queries using the available query languages (e.g. SPARQL)
can be resource inefficient. An interesting aspect is the inter-
relation of ontologies with knowledge graphs, which use
ontologies as schema (formal semantics) for a graph-based
database representation. The most well-known knowledge
graphs are the Google Knowledge Graph,8 DBPedia [75],
and Geonames.9 In addition to graph databases as long-term
persistent storage, XML is suitable for storing the RDF
triples.
E. PROPERTIES OF CONTEXT
For a technical use of context, it is important to consider
that context information has or may have different properties.
A particularly important concept is that context is an abstrac-
tion [69]. Compared to raw data that represent low-level
information, such as sensor readings, context information is
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TABLE 2. Properties of context information.
a description of a situation (see definition of Dey and Abowd
in section IV), relationships between contexts form another
level of abstraction. This includes both temporal and logical
relationships, e.g. a sequence of contexts in which our vehicle
is situated. Sanchez et. al [76] emphasized the distinction
between raw (sensor) data and context, created by processing
the raw data. In addition, the authors considered consistency
an essential property.
Wan and Alagar [77] outline the properties of persistency,
dynamics, and trust that some of the context elements and
classes may have. Feld and Müller [78] elaborate on the
aspects that should be taken into account to model knowl-
edge in the automotive domain. Their publication particularly
addresses the high proportion of dynamic context information
in automobiles and recommends a careful consideration of
the factor time using a validity period of the context infor-
mation. The authors also refer to the uncertainty of context
information, caused by uncertain raw data on the one hand
and heuristics and inaccuracies in the derivation of the actual
context on the other hand. Finally, Feld and Müller address
privacy issues, since context information in the vehicle can
contain a high degree of personally identifiable informa-
tion (PII), such as location, usage habits, or driving style.
Accordingly, the sensitivity of the context information must
be considered as a characteristic. These properties of context
information can be divided into two categories (see Table 2).
Persistence, dynamics, and sensitivity are determined by the
context class and are therefore defined system-specifically
once at development time. However, trust, validity, and cer-
FIGURE 5. Abstraction levels of context, adapted from [69].
tainty may differ from context element to element and may
also vary at runtime.
V. OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT-AWARE VEHICLE SECURITY
AND RELATED AREAS
To consider the state of the art of context and context-
awareness in the field of vehicle and fleet security, it is
necessary to clarify the scope of the consideration. This work
aims to shed light on the following questions:
• What is the security context of vehicles and fleets?
• What methodology can we use to model and store con-
text information?
• How can we extract context from data and what are
relevant data sources?
There are still some questions left unanswered beyond our
work scope, primarily how the context is determined in detail
and how security measures can make use of this knowledge.
Nevertheless, we see the biggest challenge in the definition
of the relevant information, which is why our work focuses
on this issue.
The choice of publications considered here provides essen-
tial information on one or more of the aforementioned ques-
tions. However, none of the works found addresses all ques-
tions to our satisfaction. Since context-awareness for vehicle
and fleet security is a very new topic, only a few papers
directly refer to this subject. For this reason, we have decided
to include other areas in our overview in addition to the
publications that directly relate to the automotive applica-
tion of context information for security (see Figure 6). This
includes publications that deal with the modeling methodol-
ogy of context and the corresponding tools already outlined
in Section IV-D. Moreover, papers are relevant that deal with
the application of context in the automotive sector, though
not for security. Additionally, we are interested in methods
that deal with the aggregation, abstraction, and discovery
of relations in vehicle and fleet data, since abstraction is
one of the elementary concepts of context (see Figure 5).
Outside the automotive domain, application areas of interest
impose similar constraints on their security measures, such as
real-time capability and limited resources. Accordingly, for
example, works from the domains Internet of Things (IoT)
and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) are
considered, which use context information. As mentioned
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FIGURE 6. Overview of relevant areas for this survey.
above, the architecture of the vehicle is converging more and
more with conventional networks. POSIX-based operating
systems, high bandwidths over Ethernet networks, and higher
performance hardware lead to the fact that context-aware
security measures from traditional IT needs to be considered.
In addition to the consideration of context for individual
measures, we place particular emphasis on the area of SIEMs,
alert correlation, and threat intelligence.
Several issues are also relevant to the development of
context-aware security measures for vehicles and fleets. One
major problem in developing security measures for the auto-
motive domain is the absence of suitable datasets with both
benign and malicious behavior [15]. Especially for vehicle
fleets, no publicly accessible data set contains the required
information such as real-world attacks. Besides, the avail-
able data sets from the in-vehicle network usually lack the
coverage of all network types and the decoding of the user
data (i.e. semantics of the data). For example [79] and [80]
contain only CAN data, but no Ethernet or service-oriented
communication. Thus, simulation of the vehicle, its envi-
ronment, its internal and external communication as well as
attacks is an important category of publications to consider
here. Finally, as outlined in Section IV-E, privacy is a crucial
aspect, especially for fleet security. With the recent regula-
tions, e.g. in the EU [81], unless a person has agreed to data
processing for a specific purpose, personal data may not be
processed. Excepted from this is the fulfillment of other legal
obligations, for example, the protection of vital interests of
a person or the fulfillment of a task in the public interest.
Therefore, some PII may be accessible in backend systems,
if such legal basis exists. However, this will not be the case
for most in-vehicle data. Appropriate mechanisms, such as
anonymization, are therefore required to make the tremen-
dous amount of in-vehicle data accessible in the backend for
fleet security purposes.
A. FLEET SECURITY
Context-aware security solutions for monitoring and analyz-
ing an entire fleet are not frequent in scientific literature.
Regarding the analysis of multiple vehicles, the focus of
scientific research lies in the field of misbehavior detection
in VANETs based on V2V communication and less on cen-
tralized fleet monitoring. As indicated by recent surveys [82],
[83], the VANET solutions, in general, are mostly designed
for use in Road-Side Units or a Central Authority and not
in a backend system. To give an example, Ghaleb et al. [84]
introduce context-awareness in their solution. The authors
consider the mobility information of surrounding vehicles in
the VANET given by the internationally standardized basic
safety messages (BSM) and cooperative awareness messages
(CAM). They locally identify misbehaving vehicles in the
VANET via multiple reference models of the surrounding
vehicles’ behavior. However, local detection of misbehaving
vehicles in VANETs is not our focus, although using V2V
messages such as BSM and CAM as context information for
security decisions in a backend may be an exciting idea.
In contrast, industrial approaches are already being heav-
ily promoted. There are various providers of SIEM, SOC,
or monitoring solutions on the market, e.g. Argus Fleet Pro-
tection [54], [85], Arilou SIEM/SOC Backend Solution [86],
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HARMAN SHIELD [87], and Upstream Security’s C4 Plat-
form [88], [89]. Especially Upstream and Argus advertise
to foster context-awareness. In publicly available material,
Upstream gives as an example of context whether the vehi-
cle is driving or parking and which actions are permit-
ted in this state. Context can be used in their industrial
product to define specific rules for identifying incidents.
Kaneti [54] emphasizes that context aggregation within the
vehicle instead of deriving context from raw data in the
cloud results in data transfers of only 1-15 Mbyte per year
instead of 0.1-5 GByte per hour. Thus, a massive reduction
of the required bandwidth and consequently costs for data
transfer to the SIEM / SOC can be achieved. As examples
of context, the geolocation of the vehicle, build details, com-
ponent versions, service history, warranty data, and the IDS
configuration are mentioned. Additionally, some scientific
publications emphasizing SIEMs and fleet-wide analysis are
mentioned in the following.
1) ‘‘AUTOMOTIVE SIEM AND ANOMALY DETECTION USING
SAND-SPRINKLED ISOLATION FOREST’’ [90]
Haga et al. propose to use a SIEM system in the backend,
that analyzes in-vehicle communication and logged data. It is
based on a specific adaption of the machine-learning tech-
nique Isolation Forest to reduce false alarms, which are famil-
iar to anomaly-based IDS [90]. Additionally, they suggest
integrating vulnerability information as context / CTI from
the Auto-ISAC [62].
2) ‘‘POSTER: ANOMALY-BASED MISBEHAVIOUR DETECTION
IN CONNECTED CAR BACKENDS’’ [91]
Berlin et al. introduce SeMaCoCa (Security Management
of Services in Connected Cars), a SIEM system that aims
to detect misbehavior based on anomaly detection using
machine learning [91]. However, in addition to vehicle data,
the authors mention various external context data sources
that could improve the detection process, e.g. from external
service providers, data from service workshops, weather,
or road conditions. Although it is not explicitly referred to
as context-awareness in the respective publication, it can be
understood as a step in this direction.
3) ‘‘ADVANCED ANALYTICS FOR CONNECTED CARS CYBER
SECURITY’’ [92]
Levi et al. [92] propose a security system that is located in a
backend and uses a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which
is a machine learning approach to predict event sequences
(see Figure 7). Instead of transmitting raw vehicle data (e.g.
CAN data, operating system data) to the backend, they use a
rule-based approach to convert the raw data into events before
transmission (e.g. Logging, Engine Stop, Download App).
The HMM analyzes the events in conjunction with attributes
defined per event (e.g. location and speed). Although the
authors aim to develop an anomaly-based IDS that monitors
each vehicle of a fleet individually, the concept of events is
interesting from the perspective of context-awareness. Events
FIGURE 7. System overview of Levi et al. [92].
represent a form of abstraction and can thus describe the
context. On the one hand, this enables a universal analysis
independent of the vehicle type in SIEM/SOC, while at the
same time reducing the amount of data to be transmitted and
simplifying the understanding of the underlying raw data.
B. VEHICLE SECURITY
Concerning security measures within a vehicle, context has
already been addressed, used, or at least mentioned in other
words by several authors. For example, Al-Jarrah et al. [15]
have conducted an extensive survey that shows the current
state of the art in the field of IDS systems for in-vehicle
networks. Context-aware IDS systems are identified as a
research gap, as only a few publications in this field could be
found. According to the authors, the challenge is to develop a
vehicle-global profile of normal behavior for which different
data sources have to be combined. The publications listed
here include primarily intrusion detection systems and access
control measures and some more generic or overarching
approaches.
1) ‘‘TOWARDS A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR
PROTECTING CONNECTED VEHICLES FROM MALWARE’’ [93]
In their recent publication, Iqbal et. al [93] argue for a
complete security architecture for connected and autonomous
vehicles. In addition to well-known security mechanisms for
protection and detection such as firewalls and host-based IDS,
they emphasize the need for specific management compo-
nents for vehicle security. All components are seen as parts
of an advanced operating system. The task of one of these
components is to administer the vehicle context. According
to Iqbal et al., the vehicle context should be used to switch
between different security modes. The context-dependent
security modes are coupled with other preventive measures,
such as a dynamic access control mechanism that restricts
applications and connectivity based on the vehicle context.
However, the authors do not make a clear statement about the
relevant context information or how this information can be
derived from vehicle data and sensor information. Neverthe-
less, they give as examples of context information the type
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FIGURE 8. System architecture of Narayanan [95].
of road, if someone other than the owner is driving, and the
number of connected untrusted peripherals.
2) ‘‘DATA-DRIVEN EXTRACTION OF VEHICLE STATES FROM
CAN BUS TRAFFIC FOR CYBERPROTECTION AND
SAFETY’’ [94]
Although Moore et al. [94] do not explicitly mention the
concept of context, their publication is of interest here.
The authors present a method to derive physical vehicle
states from CAN messages, which can be considered an
aspect of context. They use the raw payload of CAN frames
without decoding it into specific vehicle signals. However,
they only infer the states idle, acceleration, maintain speed,
deceleration.
3) ‘‘USING SEMANTIC TECHNOLOGIES TO MINE VEHICULAR
CONTEXT FOR SECURITY’’ [95]
Narayanan suggests a two-step context abstraction to detect
abnormal data flows and scenarios (see Figure 8). Data of the
CAN bus is decoded by the ‘‘Local Context Detection’’ layer
to the sensor values. In addition, the first layer transforms
the raw sensor values to an abstracted measurement (e.g.
‘‘high speed’’ instead of 137.34 km/h), that is associated with
an ontology entry. The ontology is located at the level of
the ‘‘Cross Component Context Inference Engine’’ (C3IE),
which represents the global system state. The knowledge base
in C3IE is divided into four components: an extended version
of the IoT-Lite Ontology [96] (which describes IoT networks
in terms of sensors and actuators), the Domain Instances,
some Domain Specific SWRL rules, and a Reasoner. The
domain instances are the vehicle-specific sensors, such as a
speed sensor, that are mapped to the generic classes in the
ontology. The SWRL rules are used to describe high-level
context about the system state, which can be ‘‘normal’’ or
‘‘anomalous’’ here. The Reasoner is dynamically checking
the SWRL rules to infer the security state of the system.
Additionally, they point out that the rules should be based on
automatic rule-mining processes instead of specifying them
manually.
4) ‘‘A FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING ANOMALOUS
BEHAVIORS IN SMART CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS’’ [97]
In his Ph.D. thesis [97], Narayanan outlines a method to
derive an abstracted vehicle behavior, besides the approach
already presented in [95]. The so-called Automatic Behav-
ioral Abstraction Technique (ABATe) uses data of regular
vehicular operation to learn a context model. Initially, the sys-
tem generates state vectors from raw sensor data by aggre-
gating vectors whose Euclidean distance is below a certain
threshold into a single state. This defines a fixed number
of possible system states. Subsequently, a neural network
is used to generate an embedding of the state vectors into
a lower dimension, taking into account the previously seen
state vectors. The network learns to map state vectors that
generally occur together in a sequence to context vectors that
are close to each other. However, an interpretation of the
resulting context vector is difficult and may not necessarily
correspond to a human recognizable relationship. Used as
a security measure, the context model is used to identify
unknown system states or system states that do not conform
to normal operations.
5) ‘‘CONTEXT-AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION IN
AUTOMOTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS’’ [98]
Wasicek et al. propose the Context-aware Intrusion Detec-
tion System (CAIDS) [98]. CAIDS designates itself as
context-aware because it incorporates the vehicle control
systems’ physical context into an IDS. Data from sensors
and actuators exchanged between ECUs form the basis for a
reference model of the control system. The reference model
based on an autoencoder (special architecture of a neural
network) provides the first context-level by turning raw data
into events when the raw data deviates too much from the
reference model. In a subsequent step, it becomes context
on a second abstraction level by supplementing the infor-
mation about deviations from the physical reference model
with global information about the vehicle operating status.
According to the authors, state machines or decision trees
can be used for this purpose, which, depending on the state
(e.g. idle, on the highway), ensure a reasonable interpretation
of the first-level context. Reference model plus information
about the state thus serve to improve the understanding of the
semantics of the data by IDS. However, an explicit context
model is not propagated and the system is focused on the
in-vehicle context.
6) ‘‘ROAD CONTEXT-AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM FOR AUTONOMOUS CARS’’ [99]
Jiang et al. introduce the Road Context-aware IDS
(RAIDS) [99] (see Figure 9). They infer the road context from
camera images and sensor data to detect intrusions in CAN
frames. The basic idea here is that the road context influences
and determines the correct and benign vehicle signals. The
authors emphasize that with the introduction of autonomous
driving this connection becomes more and more stringent.
While today the road context induces different reactions by
differing drivers and thus varying data in the vehicle network,
autonomous cars are controlled by algorithms and computers.
Therefore the same road context should generate the same
network traffic. Jiang et al. define the road context as ‘‘the
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FIGURE 9. Concept of the road context-aware IDS by [99].
information an autonomous car is encountering when it is
cruising’’ [99]. Despite the lack of a formalmodel, the authors
outline some of the most important classes of their context
model:
• Road conditions (lane marking, crossroad, junction)
• Traffic lights, pedestrians, vehicles, obstacles, bumps,
and pits around the autonomous car
• Weather conditions (rain, fog, cloud, snow)
• Sunrise, sunset, night, and tunnel lights
A neural network, which operates on camera data, in combi-
nation with other, not more exactly specified sensor informa-
tion shall provide this context information. A second neural
network is responsible for the detection of abnormal CAN
frames. RAIDS is trained in an end-to-end approach, which
implies that no explicit context model is given. The inference
of the context information is not validated in detail. Accord-
ingly, although the authors name some contextual informa-
tion relevant from their point of view, it is not evident from
the concept presented whether this information can actually
be obtained by the first processing step.
7) ‘‘CONTEXT-AWARE ANOMALY DETECTOR FOR
MONITORING CYBER ATTACKS ON AUTOMOTIVE CAN
BUS’’ [100]
Another context-aware IDS approach was presented by
Kalutarage et al. [100]. They present an anomaly-based IDS,
aiming at contextualizing CAN messages. Yet, for the
authors, context is nothing more than a frequency distribution
of the sequences of CAN messages. The authors use a statis-
tical distribution estimated from normal behavior as context
to identify abnormal CAN messages. The main argument for
this is that the vehicle manufacturers do not disclose the exact
functions for the specific CAN IDs. From the development
perspective of the manufacturer, this argument is irrelevant.
8) ‘‘INTEGRATION OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
INTO AUTOMOTIVE ARCHITECTURES’’ [101]
Rumez et al. [101] outline a distributed attribute-based
access control (ABAC) mechanism for automotive archi-
tectures. The presented approach allows access control of
ECU requests both within a domain and between different
domains. The ABAC policies are based on dynamic attribute
values that are inferred by a Policy Information Point (PIP)
typically located in a gateway. In a gateway, the PIP has
access to several buses inside the vehicle and thus the nec-
essary information to determine the current attribute values.
From the context-awareness perspective, the attributes repre-
sent the context.With the proposed grouping of attributes into
several categories (subject, action, environment, resource) in
the standard XML-based access control policy data format
XACML, the methodology already goes beyond a simple
key-value representation. However, the authors do not go into
further detail regarding the definition of relevant attributes.
Examples mentioned include vehicle status, seat occupancy,
and location.
9) ‘‘oMAC: OPEN MODEL FOR AUTOMOTIVE
CYBERSECURITY’’ [102]
Another approach for an access control mechanism was out-
lined by Hugot et. al [102]. Their main goal is the integra-
tion of an access control mechanism in the SOME/IP proto-
col. The authors emphasize that future vehicles need dynamic
cybersecuritymechanisms, where access permissions to vehi-
cle resources such as actuators, sensors, and applications are
adjusted depending on the state of the vehicle. The access
control is based on functional flows, which are defined as
automatons. According to the state of the automaton, different
policies are active, i.e. allow for specific access. The states of
the functions are determined via so-called referencemonitors,
that are distributed across the in-vehicle network. In this
publication, the vehicle status is mainly defined by the status
of the functions. The status can be seen as part of the vehicle
security context.
10) ‘‘CONTEXT-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL IN NOVEL
AUTOMOTIVE HMI SYSTEMS’’ [103]
Finally, Gansel et al. [103] present a context-aware access
control mechanism for automotive purposes. The system pre-
sented serves to share access to a specific resource, the screen
in the cockpit, among different applications. The applications
have both safety-critical and non-critical tasks, which is why
the authors focus primarily on real-time capable implementa-
tion. Context is, on the one hand, derived from vehicle sensors
and communication events such as speed, time, location,
or phone calls. On the other hand, it is the specific state of
the managed applications. However, the system context based
on vehicle data is always directly linked to the application
context and is not considered generically or provided to other
security measures.
C. AUTOMOTIVE CONTEXT-AWARENESS AND DATA
SEMANTICS
The application areas of context-awareness in the automotive
domain are very broad, thus we select some exemplary contri-
butions in the field of intelligent, personalized, and adaptive
systems. Formore comprehensive information, please refer to
further publications, e.g. [23], [24]. Aside from that, different
ontologies have been published as domain knowledge models
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FIGURE 10. Automotive ontology and its context model [78].
for specific automotive applications, e.g. semantic middle-
ware, autonomous driving, and testing (see [104]–[107] for
example).
1) ‘‘OSGi BASED SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CONTEXT
AWARE AUTOMOTIVE TELEMATICS’’ [108]
An early design of context-aware architecture can be found
in the work of Zhang et al. [108]. Intending to enable mod-
ular context processing, they build on the Java-based service
architecture OSGi10 and develop an ontologymodel for infor-
mation representation. The ontology is divided into the four
core concepts location, user, vehicle, and computing unit,
building on the work of Wang et al. [109]. The processing
uses hardware or software signals as input. Context providers
perform an initial abstraction of the raw data, whereupon
context interpreters convert low-level context to high-level
context allowing context managers to distribute it to services.
An example of a use case is the detection of a stranger in a car,
at night and the inference of a burglary. While the Java-based
implementation may not be practical for realistic embedded
real-time automotive environments, the ontology model is
attractive for our purposes.
2) ‘‘THE AUTOMOTIVE ONTOLOGY: MANAGING
KNOWLEDGE INSIDE THE VEHICLE AND SHARING IT
BETWEEN CARS’’ [78]
A description of a possible automotive ontology is provided
by Feld and Müller, with a focus on personalized intelligent
systems. It is intended to provide semantic knowledge about
the user, the car, and the driving situation. For modeling
this knowledge, an ontology is used that is divided into the
10https://www.osgi.org/
FIGURE 11. System overview of [110] for extracting the functional context
at runtime.
two sub-domains user (e.g. preferences) and context (see
Figure 10). The latter consists of an abstracted view of the
interior’s sensor data and a description of other data such
as POIs, trips, and an external physical context. In addition,
suggestions for capturing time series, dealing with uncertain
values, and privacy are given. For our purposes, while the
extensivemodeling of physical attributes of the car is too fine-
granular (e.g. weight of the car) and therefore not relevant,
other aspects such as traffic events and trips may be of interest
for security purposes.
3) ‘‘SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN RUN-TIME AND
DESIGN-TIME VIEW OF CONTEXT-AWARE AUTOMOTIVE
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES’’ [110]
In [110], a framework is designed to detect abnormal use of
a particular vehicle function. The framework is divided into
eight steps (see Figure 11). The data (‘‘signals’’) of all vehicle
functions (software components, ‘‘SW-C’’) is collected in the
vehicle gateway (1). The gateway is a central ECU in the
vehicle that is connected to several buses and can access all
vehicle data. The amount of data is reduced there by a feature
selection algorithm (2) that selects the signals that are cor-
related with the given vehicle function. The selected vehicle
signals define the context of the function, which is used to
train a nominal model (3). It is learned by acquiring statistical
parameters of the function context. An anomaly is defined by
a deviation from the learned statistical parameters (4).When a
deviation is detected, it is reported to the backend (5). A state
machine with two states (‘‘normal’’, ‘‘anomalous’’) is gener-
ated to represent the situation of the function (6). If anomalies
are detected, the responsible engineers are notified (7) and
countermeasures (e.g. an update) can be initiated (8).
Beyond, the authors extend their work in [111]–[113].
Identifying the context of a function (i.e. correlated signals
of the in-vehicle network) is used to derive a personaliza-
tion model that reflects when a driver deactivates certain
functions. This is the personal nominal model of functional
behavior. Deviations from this behavior (i.e. anomalies) can
result either from software or hardware faults as well as cyber-
attacks. Compared to the previous work [110] the identified
subset of vehicle signals was subdivided into six groups
in [113]. The group driving context contained signals such as
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FIGURE 12. Scenario abstraction levels in PEGASUS [114].
road type, speed limit, and temperatures. To identify the vehi-
cle’s security context, the feature selection approach seems
promising to derive the relevant context information of any
user-level function (e.g. cruise control). However, the authors
note that the relevant subset of signals varies largely from
driver to driver.
4) ‘‘ONTOLOGY BASED SCENE CREATION FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES’’ [115]
In the PEGASUS project,11 an ontology-based method for
creating virtual scenes for testing autonomous vehicles was
developed [115]. Driving scenes are modeled with different
aspects such as road layout and topology, the traffic infras-
tructure and temporal manipulations of the aforementioned
(e.g. construction sites), static and dynamic objects on the
road (e.g. cars, maneuvers), and finally environmental con-
ditions (e.g. weather). Of course, the maneuvers and pre-
cise descriptions are relevant for developing vehicles that
act safely in every possible situation. However, as security
attacks can influence the physical behavior of a vehicle, a very
abstracted view of the driving scenario may be of interest for
security purposes, e.g. in the form of functional scenarios (see
Figure 12).
5) ‘‘VEHICLE SIGNAL SPECIFICATION - STANDARDIZED WAY
TO DESCRIBE AUTOMOTIVE DATA’’ [116]
The Vehicle signal Specification (VSS) is a taxonomy for the
internal vehicle signals, which is standardized by the World
WideWeb Consortium (W3C) and developed by the GENIVI
Alliance. The uniform semantic definition of the signals
existing in the vehicle enables a common and consistent pool
of data for applications in the vehicle. The taxonomy focuses
on conventional sensors, actuators, and data of infotainment
systems.
6) ‘‘GENERATING SEMANTIC TRAJECTORIES USING A CAR
SIGNAL ONTOLOGY’’ [117], [118]
Based on VSS (see Section V-C5) and further ontologies,12
Klotz et al. create an extensive ontology for vehicle signals
11https://www.pegasusprojekt.de/de/
12e.g. Semantic Sensor Network Ontology (SOSA)https://www.w3.org/
TR/vocab-ssn/
and sensors [118]. The VSS ontology (VSSo) is used in com-
bination with the STEP ontology [119] to map trajectories
using the ontology’s vocabulary and enrich it with semantic
information in the referenced publication. For this purpose,
they develop modules for adding and annotating the sensor
observations, as well as for graphical representation. The
static part of the knowledge base is generated by parsing vehi-
cle configuration files. Dynamic aspects, i.e. observed sensor
measurements are added as new RDF instances. To relate the
sensor values to points in time and space, the stored triples
are tagged with markers for the coordinates and the time. The
project is validated using a data stream from the vehicle sim-
ulator OpenXC. While the aforementioned VSS taxonomy
(Section V-C5) is seen as the data model for applications in
the vehicle, the W3C promotes the VSS ontology as the data
model for applications in the cloud.13
7) ‘‘DESIGN OF AN EVENT-BASED ARCHITECTURE FOR THE
INTRA-VEHICULAR CONTEXT PERCEPTION’’ [120]
Terroso-Saenz et al. aim to determine the context in the
vehicle to provide personalized and intelligent services in the
vehicle and infrastructure. The focus here is on identifying
travel routes concerning the places visited, classifying them,
and deriving information about the vehicle occupancy [120],
[121]. A Complex Event Processing (CEP) approach handles
data from different sources and identifies elements from a
defined context model (see Figure 13). The model consists
of dynamic (location, activity, time, and identity) and static
(vehicle owner/features) context. In [120] an architecture
with five context modules is designed to extract the dif-
ferent aspects. The vehicle state module uses a fuzzy logic
approach to determine whether the vehicle is in motion or
has come to a stop. In addition, the Occupancy module
determines passenger groups based on the behavior when
boarding the vehicle. Finally, the vehicle location coordinates
are clustered, assigned to landmarks, and connected to routes
between landmarks with itineraries or itinerary segments.
8) ‘‘AUTOMOTIVE CONTEXT-AWARE POLICY SYSTEM FOR
CAR CONNECTIVITY REQUESTS’’ [122]
In her work, Copeland describes the Context-Aware Policy
System (CAPS) for vehicle connectivity based on enterprise
policies. The system aims at the fact that vehicle manufac-
turers operate a fleet of devices that are connected to the
mobile network and as such incur costs for mobile network
connectivity. Therefore, awareness of the car context shall
encourage the selection of the best available access network
and roaming network, e.g. to reduce these costs and mitigate
risks for commercially sensitive data. The author’s important
statement is that the vehicle context must be distinguished
from the driver context, as different drivers must be expected
in the case of shared mobility. Moreover, the different data
sources for context are emphasized in detail, listed separately
for each stakeholder of the system’s goal (carrier, vehicle
13https://www.w3.org/auto/
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FIGURE 13. Intra-vehicular context of Terroso-Saenz et al. [120].
TABLE 3. Key factors of a vehicle’s context [122].
service provider, car/fleet). The publication mentions nine
key factors (KF) (see Table 3).
9) ‘‘SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF DRIVING SEQUENCES BY
ADAPTATION OF WORD EMBEDDINGS’’ [123]
Ries et al. adapt ideas from Natural Language Processing
to enable the semantic interpretation of driving data in their
respective contexts. The Word2Vec approach, which was
developed initially for embedding words in language process-
ing tasks, is transferred to automotive data sets. To enable
this, they convert multivariate time series from e.g. test drives
for the development of autonomous driving algorithms into
discrete driving states using a binning approach. Subse-
quently, a dimension reduction is performed using a semantic
embedding with neural networks (see figure 14) to obtain a
FIGURE 14. Semantic embedding in word2vec manner [123].
low-dimensional space instead of the high-dimensional input
space. In this space, distances between two journeys can be
calculated and semantically similar journeys automatically
arrange themselves with a small distance between them.
However, there is no ad-hoc grouping of the embedded space
into meaningful or coherent regions or classes. The analysis
and interpretation of why driving sequences are similar and
close to each other must be made manually. In addition,
the binning of the signals must be specified. Therefore, this
approach is only feasible for a small number of signals. Nev-
ertheless, this is a helpful approach to abstract the physical
behavior of the vehicle. Whether the neural networks are
suitable for use in the vehicle, however, remains open.
10) ‘‘UNSUPERVISED DRIVE TOPIC FINDING FROM DRIVING
BEHAVIORAL DATA’’ [125]
Bando et al. [125] and their preliminary work in [124]
emphasize an Unsupervised Machine Learning method for
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FIGURE 15. Unsupervised data aggregation [124], [125].
segmenting driving behavioral data into driving scenes and
likewise in drive topics (see Figure 15). As the first step,
they use a method based on Hidden Markov Models (HMM)
called double articulation analyzer (DAA) to convert the
behavioral data to driving scenes [124]. However, the authors
elaborate that for one hour of driving, the algorithm finds
more than 400 different driving scenes, which are discrete
but not intuitive to understand. Thus, as the second step, they
propose to use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), to group
the scenes to a manageable number of drive topics. The
clustering is performed according to the distribution of the
physical input features. Additionally, each topic’s name (a
label) is found automatically as the most frequent feature
of the topic’s statistical distribution. A significant challenge
with machine learning methods is that a large data set must
be available to represent the totality of the driving scenes.
D. IT NETWORK SECURITY
The range of publications that mention context, context-
awareness or situation-awareness for known security mecha-
nisms in enterprise IT and mobile devices is very wide. Both
areas are generally not safety-critical and are therefore not
subject to the strict real-time requirements that we have in
the automotive and other industries. Only a small percent-
age of publications deal with systematic context-awareness,
many publications consider only one item of contextual
information (e.g. a variable and hence adaptive blacklist
of IP addresses [126]), few items (e.g. location [127]),
or do not give more precise information about which con-
text information is used. The most frequent applications of
context-awareness include Intrusion Detection Systems and
Access Controls.
1) ‘‘ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: 10 YEARS OF APPLYING
CONTEXT-AWARE SECURITY’’ [65]
In their overview work, Sinha et al. [65] emphasize three
elementary types of context information. The authors
describe the vulnerability profile, which comprises the set
of known vulnerabilities relevant to the system (machine,
OS, applications). Secondly, the attack surface is mentioned.
On the one hand, this comprises the occurring attacks and,
in addition, all kinds of information about the attackers, such
as their goals and methods. The last aspect is the usage
model, which aims at prioritizing the defense according to
the importance of the services and applications. In addition
to the frequency of use of the services, information such as
the importance of the data and the opportunity costs in case
of failure are referred to. For the application of context infor-
mation to the use cases already outlined in Section IV-B, there
are two key challenges according to the authors: diversity
among networks and the dynamic nature of context. This is
also true for the application in vehicles.
2) ‘‘ONTOSECURE: A SEMANTIC WEB BASED TOOL FOR
NETWORK SECURITY STATUS PREDICTION’’ [128]
Bhandari and Singh introduce the tool OntoSecure, which is
based on ontologies to improve the network security situa-
tional awareness. The system context in the form of ontology
is intended to support the system administrator in making
the right cyber-defense decisions. Based on the created OWL
models for network, services, and attacks, as well as dynamic
context updates based on SWRL rules, an abstract network
security status is determined and predicted (see Figure 16).
The SWRL rules are used to process the inputs in the form
of configuration changes, new vulnerabilities, and attacks
and to update the ontology. Further details of the underlying
ontologies are not presented.
3) ‘‘DROID MOOD SWING (DMS): AUTOMATIC SECURITY
MODES BASED ON CONTEXTS’’ [130]
Iqbal and Zulkernine introduce a component for the
Android mobile phone operating system called Droid Mood
Swing (DMS) that detects the phone’s context. The con-
text defines security modes, which enable automatic permis-
sion restrictions, an inter-process firewall, restricted network
access, and file system access control. DMS is based on the
author’s work Flamingo [129] (see Figure 17). The context
parameters used are described carefully (see table 4), but
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FIGURE 16. Overview of the OntoSecure system [128].
FIGURE 17. The Flamingo framework for security context management in
Android smartphones [129].
FIGURE 18. Situation aware intrusion detection [133].
they are not formally structured (e.g., with an ontology or
other model). Different sub-contexts can be active for the
superordinate security context that is determined based on the
location. The mechanism for temporarily holding the current
context in DMS is not described in greater detail.
4) ‘‘ENHANCING THE ACCURACY OF NETWORK-BASED
INTRUSION DETECTION WITH HOST-BASED CONTEXT’’ [131]
In an early work, the open-source Bro Network Intrusion
Detection System, which is now known as Zeek14 is extended
with context information from the hosts that are part of the
14https://zeek.org/
TABLE 4. Context parameters of Flamingo [129].
monitored network. The authors deal specifically with the
monitoring of HTTP traffic, as this makes up the majority
of Internet traffic. The advantage of context extraction on
the host is that, unlike IDS, the host can decrypt the traffic,
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FIGURE 19. Security intelligence graph [134].
process the HTTP request thoroughly, and knows all redi-
rections to addresses other than the one originally requested.
On this basis, the IDS is provided with the following context
information: the hosts and TCP ports, the original request
string, the final URL after redirection, the name of the file
being served, and the HTTP reply code.
5) ‘‘ConXsense - AUTOMATED CONTEXT CLASSIFICATION
FOR CONTEXT-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL’’ [132]
Miettinen et al. introduce a framework for context-aware
access control on mobile phones which is called ConXsense.
The framework’s contextual information is the GPS-based
location context of visited areas, the set of visited WiFi areas,
and the social context of the device. The social context is
defined by the Bluetooth devices that are typically around
the device of interest. In addition to very detailed explana-
tions on the calculation of the individual context information,
the authors determine statistically derived information from
the mentioned context, e.g. maximum total visit time of any
GPS-based context, average encounter time of familiar Blue-
tooth devices. These features are used as input for a machine
learning approach, which classifies the context into secure
and insecure or public and confidential respectively.
6) ‘‘A KNOWLEDGE-BASED APPROACH TO INTRUSION
DETECTION MODELING’’ [133]
An approach for a situational aware Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem is presented by More et al. [133]. The system uses an
ontology with base classes means, targets and consequences
for creating a knowledge base and detecting intrusions that
are related to known vulnerabilities or attack methods. With
different data sources, either properties of ontology classes
are added (e.g. IP address) or object triples of a class are
generated (e.g. a specific buffer overflow attack), and the
knowledge base is filled. Figure 18 shows the sources and
some of the information integrated into the ontology and
knowledge base.
E. SIEM SYSTEMS AND ALERT CORRELATION
Besides integrating context information in security measures
such as access controls, context is especially required in the
process of intrusion response. Here, alerts are analyzed and
correlated with other alerts. However, to gain insight into
what an alarm could mean for an enterprise or network, for
example, to answer the questions was this an attack, what
impact does the attack have, what is affected by it, additional
information is required. The selected publications are all
based on the common idea of a security knowledge graph,
which is in some way supported by one or more ontologies.
The ontologies define the vocabularies and relationships for
performing the respective actions, e.g. attack reconstruction,
alarm aggregation, identification of malicious entities. Never-
theless, the information contained and the applications differ.
1) ‘‘THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE GRAPH: WHITE
PAPER’’ [134]
Recorded Future provides context about threat actors and cap-
tured information of the internet with its Security Intelligence
Graph. The graph-based data structure shall enable analysts
as well as algorithms to pivot through the stored relationships,
e.g. vulnerabilities, threat actors, or organizations associated
with the actors. The security intelligence context is subdi-
vided into an ontology graph and an event graph which are
connected (see Figure 19).While the ontology graph captures
the static information about entities in the cybersecurity land-
scape (companies, countries, IP addresses), the event graph
contains the real-world cyber attacks.
2) ‘‘DEVELOPING AN ONTOLOGY FOR CYBER SECURITY
KNOWLEDGE GRAPHS’’ [135]
Another approach for a knowledge graph is presented by
Iannacone et al. [135]. The STUCCO ontology is developed
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FIGURE 20. STUCCO ontology [135].
as the schema for the integration of different structured and
unstructured information sources in the knowledge graph and
is part of an open-source cyber intelligence platform.15 The
ontology consists of 15 entity types and 115 properties (see
Figure 20). In comparison to other approaches, the authors
use the GraphSON format for describing the triples of their
knowledge base instead of RDF triples. The graph shall serve
for incident response, e.g. searching for impacted hosts and
flows, and automated response such as adjusting firewall
rules.
3) ‘‘ONTIDS: A HIGHLY FLEXIBLE CONTEXT-AWARE AND
ONTOLOGY-BASED ALERT CORRELATION
FRAMEWORK’’ [136]
The ONTIDS framework for alert correlation is presented
by Sadighian et al. [136], [137]. The authors aim to reduce
the false alarm rates of Intrusion Detection Systems by inte-
grating available context information. ONTIDS is based on
an ontology for the representation and storage of alert infor-
mation, alert context, vulnerability information, and attack
scenarios (see Figure 21). For integrating the alert data of
different IDS systems, the IDMEF16 is used. The correla-
tion is based on SQWRL and SWRL rules that implement
two steps: context- and vulnerability-based filtering of given
alerts to determine possible attack scenarios and afterward,
try to match a sequence of previous alerts to reconstruct the
entire attack scenario.
4) ‘‘SEMANTIC AWARE ATTACK SCENARIOS
RECONSTRUCTION’’ [138]
Saad and Traore outline an attack scenario reconstruction
approach based on alerts of multiple IDS systems. With
their concept, the alerts that are related and thus form one
specific attack scenario are identified. The authors build on
a self-defined intrusion ontology in whose format the alerts
are initially transformed. More details on the ontology can
be found in an earlier work of the authors, see [139]. Interest-
ingly, the authors calculate a semantic relevance between two
alerts a and b in the ontology (e.g. has the same goal) based
15http://stucco.github.io/
16Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
on the number of relations between these alerts and construct
a graph from it. Attack scenarios are extracted from the graph
as maximum cliques. Another transformation step converts
a group of related alerts found into a new graph, which
takes causal relationships into account. A causal relationship
between two alerts a and b exists if the effects of a have a large
intersection with the required preconditions of b. Besides,
the authors describe a step for filtering false alerts based
on environmental data such as network topology or security
policies, however, they do not emphasize how to do that in
detail.
5) ‘‘A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTING A
KNOWLEDGE GRAPH FOR CYBERSECURITY’’ [140]
Jia et al. introduce an approach to construct a cybersecurity
knowledge graph based on an ontology that is automati-
cally populated from structured and unstructured informa-
tion. A machine learning approach called conditional ran-
dom field is implemented to extract elements (i.e. classes,
instances for the ontology) from the data sources, e.g. vulner-
ability and attack databases. Additionally, the authors employ
rules to find new relationships and attribute values.
6) ‘‘UCO: A UNIFIED CYBERSECURITY ONTOLOGY’’ [141]
The increasing number of existing cybersecurity ontologies
and open knowledge bases was unified by Syed et al. in
their Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO) [141]. The
authors reuse their preliminary work (e.g. the STUCCO
ontology of [135]) as well as the Structured Threat Infor-
mation eXpression (STIX) format [142] and prominent stan-
dards and ontologies, e.g. CVE, CCE, CVSS, CAPEC,
CYBOX, KillChain, DBpedia [75], and Yago [143]. The
authors describe their unified ontology’s basic classes and
how they map to classes in the reused ontologies. Further-
more, exemplary SPARQL queries are discussed, that search
the available triples of information in selected use cases, e.g.
Suggest similar software to given software andVulnerabilities
associated with PDF Readers.
7) ‘‘RelExt: RELATION EXTRACTION USING DEEP LEARNING
APPROACHES FOR CYBERSECURITY KNOWLEDGE GRAPH
IMPROVEMENT’’ [144]
Pingle et al. base on the work of Syed et al. (see Section V-
E6) and define UCO 2.0. This ontology is using classes and
relationships defined in STIX 2.0. Accordingly, their work
describes attacks and the techniques, actors, and indications
for such. The focus of the work, though, is that the relations
described in the ontology are obtained from publicly available
security texts (e.g. social media) using machine learning.
The proposed system called RelExt consists of three steps.
First, a Named Entity Recognizer extracts security-relevant
terms from the text. Then, a Word2Vec model trained on
cybersecurity terms transforms the textual terms in vectors
of fixed length. Finally, each two of the extracted vectors are
classified using a feedforward neural network concerning the
relation existing between them.
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FIGURE 21. ONTIDS alert correlation and ontology [136].
8) ‘‘The SEPSES KNOWLEDGE GRAPH: AN INTEGRATED
RESOURCE FOR CYBERSECURITY’’ [145]
While either most of the existing cybersecurity ontologies
published in the literature are not available for download
and the respective security knowledge graphs are not pop-
ulated with actual knowledge extracted from the web and
databases, Kiesling et al. aim to close this gap. Their SEPSES
knowledge graph [145], as well as the underlying ontol-
ogy, are freely available for download and query. In addi-
tion, a process is implemented that frequently accesses pub-
lic databases such as CVE, NVD, CVSS, CPE, CWE, and
CAPEC to automatically update and broaden the knowledge
base. In contrast to other publications, the knowledge graph
is not focused on solving specific problems, e.g. vulnerability
analysis. Therefore, the knowledge base must be extended to
include the appropriate information for each use case. How-
ever, the authors present examples from intrusion detection
and vulnerability assessment using their knowledge graph.
9) ‘‘MalRank: A MEASURE OF MALICIOUSNESS IN
SIEM-BASED KNOWLEDGE GRAPHS’’ [146]
Finally, likewise, the recent work of Najafi et al. introduces
a knowledge graph for SIEM systems [146]. The schema
of the knowledge graph is not very comprehensive but well
emphasized and spans information from system logs and
cyber threat intelligence. On the side of the logs, proxy, DNS,
and DHCP logs are integrated, while the open databases
integrate IP Ranges, ASN (Autonomous System Numbers),
X.509 certificates, DNS Resource Records, and known mali-
cious domains and IPs. However, the publication focuses on
a graph-based algorithm called MalRank, which identifies
malicious entities in the knowledge graph. Based on a set of
known malicious entities, a precise scoring metric is used to
infer a rating of the other entities.
F. SECURITY CONTEXT FOR THE (INDUSTRIAL) INTERNET
OF THINGS
Since the Internet of Things and industrial control system
devices are subject to similar resource constraints as in the
automotive field, it is worth taking a brief look at adaptive and
context-aware security for this field. In addition to conceptual
work, practical approaches to e.g. authentication are being
worked on.
1) ‘‘CONTEXT-AWARE SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS’’ [77]
Wan and Alagar outline their idea of context-aware security
for cyber-physical systems (CPS). As the vehicle is a CPS as
well, such concepts may be of interest to us. Besides defining
properties of context information for CPS (see Section IV-
E), the authors mention system context, user context, envi-
ronmental context, temporal context, and physical context as
the relevant categories of context information. It is expected
that specific ontologies are used to model this information.
However, they do not specify one. Instead, the authors focus
on a formal notation of context, which is used to describe
access control policies.
2) ‘‘HANDLING A TRILLION (UNFIXABLE) FLAWS ON A
BILLION DEVICES’’ [147]
An overview of open challenges in securing the IoT world
was given by Yu et al. They emphasize the need for
context-aware security policies because of the strong depen-
dencies between the different IoT devices. The publication
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follows a brute force approach to include context-awareness
in policies by specifying the set of possible states the entire
system may be in as |S| =
∏
i,j |Ci| × |Ej|. Ci is the security
context of the devices, e.g. normal, suspicious and Ej are
the environmental context information with discrete values,
e.g. temperature = high/low. While being expressive, this
approach yields a possible explosion of system states with a
rising number of devices.
3) ‘‘AN ONTOLOGY-BASED SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING IN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS’’ [148]
Mozzaquatro et al. performed a literature review of IoT tech-
nology, information security, ontologies, and other knowl-
edge representation schemes and used the MENTOR method
to derive an ontology for IoT Security called IoTSec [149].
Their reference ontology includes assets, threats, vulnera-
bilities, and security mechanisms. In [148], this ontology
is used in a security framework for IoT devices to enable
adaptive security mechanisms. The mechanisms are based
on rules, e.g. access control and authorization. However,
the authors don’t emphasize the adaptation mechanisms.
Besides, the approach to data collection to populate the
knowledge base at runtime is only superficially presented.
4) ‘‘NETWORK SECURITY SITUATION AWARENESS BASED
ON SEMANTIC ONTOLOGY AND USER-DEFINED RULES FOR
INTERNET OF THINGS’’ [150]
The idea of network security situation awareness (NSSA) for
IoT is introduced by Xu et al. [150]. The maturity of the
NSSA can be divided into three levels: perception, evaluation,
and prediction. The authors propose a situation reasoning
method based on an ontology and various manually defined
SWRL rules to integrate the heterogeneous information from
different sources, addressing the first two levels of NSSA.
In addition to categories frequently used in other publications
such as attacks, alerts, vulnerabilities, and configuration (here
named with context), the specially defined ontology includes
Netflows (see Figure 22). The publication does not deal with
the implementation or experimental evaluation in depth.
5) ‘‘PUTTING THINGS IN CONTEXT: SECURING INDUSTRIAL
AUTHENTICATION WITH CONTEXT INFORMATION’’ [151]
The group of Anton et al. addresses with several publica-
tions the security of industrial IoT and SCADA environments
[151]–[153]. In [151], the authors focus on including con-
text information in the authentication mechanism RADIUS.
They use a simple scheme of location, access time, and the
criticality of the action that shall be authorized (i.e. default
access or privileged access). The location context is provided
by the IP address, allowing for differing between on-site and
off-site access. In [152] they present an aggregation model
of industrial IoT data, which the authors call context-based
data. They introduce three levels of abstraction, with raw net-
work packets on the first level, network flow on the second,
and a network flow graph on the third level. Furthermore,
the authors aim to collect the effect of network traffic in
the form of e.g. machine log files as well as data for the
causes of the traffic, e.g. configuration logs, or application
data. However, the model is straightforward and has to be
concretized to fulfill a specific use case.
6) ‘‘MANAGING CONTEXT INFORMATION FOR ADAPTIVE
SECURITY IN IOT ENVIRONMENTS’’ [154]
Hernandez-Ramos et al. are developing a security framework
that can be used, for example, to adapt the identity manage-
ment and authorization of IoT devices to a situation. Without
going into detail about the intended contextual information
they want to use, the authors plan to use the modeling lan-
guage SensorML17 in its JSON form to describe the IoT data.
The authors argue that this approach is less resource-intensive
than modeling the data with ontologies and therefore better
suited for IoT. Furthermore, Complex Event Processing is
envisaged as a technology for concluding high-level contexts.
However, the work remains on a more theoretical level.
G. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
As the literature analysis has shown, some works remain on
a theoretical level and do not deal with evaluation. Context-
awareness is a challenge in this respect. To check the validity
and performance of methods to derive context from data,
it has to be defined which raw information is needed. Above
all, a data set with this raw information and ideally known
context has to be available. Such a data set should therefore
contain on the one hand the issue of security via attacks
and alarms, on the other hand, the vehicle and its network
communication as well as its environment. In addition, data
should not only be available for one vehicle but a fleet.
Otherwise, solutions for analysis in SIEM systems can only
be validated to a limited extent. However, there is a lack of
public data sets with attacks [15] in the area of automotive
security, which makes it very difficult to compare techniques.
Data sets of vehicle-internal communication are generally
hardly available, not in realistic complexity (e.g. no Ethernet
and traffic from service-oriented communication), or can-
not be used because the decoding of the payload data is
manufacturer-specific. Special attention in the development
of context-adaptive security measures will therefore have to
be paid to the simulation of such data sets. For example,
simulations are usually used to investigate security measures
for VANETs [82], since almost the same problem arises here.
We do not want to go into detail about individual publi-
cations here, but rather name some popular simulators that
are maintained and refer the reader to them. Ahmed et al.
give a comprehensive overview of simulators for VANETs
and emphasize three categories of simulators: mobility gen-
erators, network simulators, and VANET simulators, where
the latter is either a standalone product or a framework com-
bining simulators from the other two categories. In addition,
we look at the publication of Lekidis and Barosan, which con-
sider simulators for vehicle internal networks [155]. Besides
17https://www.ogc.org/standards/sensorml
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FIGURE 22. Ontology for network situation awareness including the sub-concepts [150].
in-vehicle networks, external communication, and mobility
of fleets, the vehicles’ physical environment has to be simu-
lated to some extent, to yield the driving behavior. For this
purpose, we refer to the publication of Tong et al. [156],
where simulators and tools for this purpose are compared.
We include CARLA [157], LGSVL,18 and IPG CarMaker19
in our listing (see Table 5). Moreover, attacks need to be
simulated, e.g. generated in a reproducible way. Evaluation
platforms may provide a way to generate such attacks, e.g.
[158], [159]. Nevertheless, the solutions known from enter-
prise IT such as Kali [160] and Metasploit [161] are increas-
ingly important due to the transformation of the in-vehicle
architectures towards IT networks.
H. PRIVACY
Finally, also privacy is a field we have to look into when
developing context-aware security for vehicles and fleets.
Vehicle data initially belongs to the user or owner of the
vehicle and includes a varying degree of sensitivity [162].
Particular protection is required for direct communication of
the user via the vehicle, e.g. telephone, user’s calendar as
well as personal data and preferences, such as the identity
and usage patterns of vehicle applications. Less sensitive
are data about the environmental conditions or the technical
condition of the vehicle [162]. Since even a speed signal is
sufficient to trace PII such as location [163], the transmission
of raw data from the vehicle to a backend to establish behav-




especially outside the vehicle, either explicit authorization
must be granted or legal regulations must require it. Other-
wise, suitable anonymization or pseudonymization measures
must be used to remove personal data and ensure privacy.
In pseudonymization, identification features are replaced by
pseudonyms (e.g. arbitrary code). With the help of this map-
ping principle, pseudonymized data can be traced back to
the original data set, if required. In contrast, anonymization
procedures do not allow the identity to be traced back. In the
literature different possibilities for this are presented [164]:
• Remove the sensitive attribute from the dataset, e.g. the
vehicle identification number (VIN). However, it may
not be sufficient to remove only characteristics, if identi-
fication can be made from other available side-data sets.
• k-anonymity [165]: In k-anonymity, multiple instances
are grouped in such a way that at least k instances
form each group and share some quasi-identifiers. The
quasi-identifiers have the same value for all k instances
in each group. To turn attributes into such quasi-
identifiers, values must be generalized, i.e., instead of
speed 10.42ms , for example, the speed is specified in a
range, e.g., speed between 10ms and 20
m
s .
• l-diversity and t-closeness [166], [167]: l-diversity com-
plements k-anonymity to ensure that the sensitive
attributes within a group with the same quasi-identifiers
are different. This is important because otherwise the
values of the quasi-identifiers can be used to imme-
diately infer the value of the sensitive attributes.
t-closeness furthermore attempts to approximate the dis-
tribution of sensitive values within a group to the distri-
bution in the entire data set.
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TABLE 5. Tools for fleet simulation.
Besides these approaches for anonymizing an entire dataset,
differential privacy has been established as an alternative
scheme that can be applied to streaming data, e.g. single
instances of data sent from a vehicle to a backend. The basic
approach here is to add a certain amount of noise to the
data set. This allows to specify and ensure a mathematically
precise level of privacy. Data that has been anonymized
using differential privacy allows making statistical inferences
about the entire data set. However, statements about a single
dataset are only of limited use, since the added noise makes
an exact answer difficult. Nelson and Olovsson provide a
good overview of how the method can be used for vehicle
data [168]. Recently, Hassan et al. published a general sur-
vey on differential privacy, which deals with cyber-physical
systems [164].
In a certain way, the abstraction or generalization of raw
data into contextual information helps to ensure privacy.
Since this generally no longer involves fine-grained informa-
tion, but only abstract values that specify ranges or categories,
the de-anonymization of data is made more difficult.
VI. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
For the central step of this work, the comparison of the
analyzed publications and the deduction of open research
areas based on their results, it is necessary to define the com-
parison criteria. On the one hand, a comparison concerning
the methods, objectives, and technologies used is necessary
to identify typical approaches independent of the contextual
information considered (see Section VI-A). In addition, for
precise and fine-grained modeling of the relevant automotive
security context, it is important to compare which context
information was used in the considered work. We present the
required taxonomy (see Section VI-B) before the comparison
is discussed in detail.
A. TAXONOMY OF METHODS AND APPROACHES
To compare the different approaches and highlight interesting
features, a comparative taxonomy is required (see Table 6).
For this purpose, we take some parts of the notation of
Perera et al. [16] with the concepts modeling and reasoning.
We extend their taxonomy by the points used technologies,
if the resources are available and the scope of the publi-
cation. The publications analyzed in this survey originate
from application areas of context-awareness rather than being
generic approaches.We therefore interpret the term reasoning
more broadly than, for example, Perera et al.. In our work,
in addition to the primarily ontology-based automatic rea-
soning methods (e.g., included in Apache Jena21) that are
well known in the context-awareness domain, we consider
reasoning to encompass in general themethods used to extract
context from given data. To highlight publications that pursue
a generic approach to context-awareness, e.g., through a con-
text management component, or extract context that can be
used in a way that is not only application-specific, we extend
the taxonomy by adding the item generic / management.
Items in brackets indicate partial fulfillment of the respective
category.
B. TAXONOMY OF THE CONSIDERED CONTEXT
INFORMATION CATEGORIES
For an analysis of the considered works, it is interesting from
our point of view, in addition to the conceptual comparison
such as the modeling methods used, which information was
considered as context information for the respective work.
To this end, it is necessary to form the superset or, depending
on the application area, the subset of the utilized context
information. The set of selected information helps us the
answer our question ’what is context’.
After our initial analyses, we identified the following cate-
gories of context information that emerged in the publications
we examined and are of interest to us:
21https://jena.apache.org/documentation/inference/
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TABLE 6. Taxonomy for comparison of relevant publications.
1) TIME
Time is an essential factor when it comes to expressing the
course of an attack, for example, or to describe that two vehi-
cles are attacked simultaneously. For contextual information,
simultaneously does not necessarily mean exactly at the same
time, but for example on the same day. Thus, time context is
more than just containing the exact current time.
2) ENVIRONMENT
Information describing the physical environment of the vehi-
cle is considered as category ‘‘environment context’’. Since
the physical environment can change very frequently while
driving, environmental contexts are the more stationary or
slowly changing parts of these environmental conditions, e.g.
the weather.
3) LOCATION
Location context information is, for example, the current
country we are in or some visited distinct locations. The loca-
tion could have been considered as part of the environment.
However, as publications tend to focus either on the physical
conditions or the positioning and points of interest (POI)
aspect, we separate these categories. Additionally, while the
weather might change more or less frequently, it is changing
very seldom if a specific GPS position is part of one country
or another.
4) USER
The user category describes the contextual information about
the user(s) of the vehicle. The term user can encompass much
more than just the driver or passengers. Information about
other persons related to the vehicle, e.g. mechanic, backend
operator, can also be seen as context.
5) NETWORK
Information describing the communication network is a rel-
evant context for security mechanisms, since attacks, for
example, typically manifest themselves via network commu-
nication. Under network context, we include all information
that concerns data flows on the one hand and the applications
in the network on the other. Network context in the vehicle
includes the Ethernet networks familiar from IT as well as
context relating to legacy automotive bus systems such as
CAN.
6) BEHAVIOR
For the vehicle as a cyber-physical system, information about
the physical state and behavior has been included as context
by various publications. In terms of security, attacks with
physical impact may be critical to safety, and accordingly,
behavioral information is relevant contextual information.
7) SECURITY ALERTS
Depending on the publication’s use case, security events
and alerts triggered by security measures were considered
as context information. Their history, origin, or the reason
for triggering are highly immediate pieces of information
that provide context for other security measures. Information
about attacks, whether actually taking place or descriptions
of typical methods, falls under this category as well.
8) SECURITY STATUS
Under the category security status we summarize here all
context information, which was indirectly derived from the
input data of the considered systems. For example, we include
a metric that derives an overall system security status such as
‘secure’, ‘attacked’ based on alarms and network data as such
context information.
9) VULNERABILITIES
The vulnerabilities category contains all contextual informa-
tion describing a security weakness of the system, i.e. some
way to get into the system or manipulate it. This can be, for
example, a reference to public databases or a criticality metric
that assesses the severity of a vulnerability.
10) CONFIGURATION
Since vulnerabilities are usually associated with specific
versions and combinations of software, operating systems,
or hardware, it is helpful to consider such information as
a security context. Many publications that include vulnera-
bilities have therefore included some form of description of
the system configuration, i.e. the static state of the system.
In vehicles today, the configuration is relatively static after the
start of production, though it will change dynamically in the
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future due to the increased use of OTA updates or customer
functions that can be purchased on-demand.
11) EXTERNAL
Additional contextual information, that is not included in the
aforementioned categories can be interesting context infor-
mation in specific cases. For example, this could be data
that resides outside the company’s ecosystem and is retrieved
as needed. Among these, we have taken traffic information,
weather forecasts, or news stories such as tweets into account.
Some publications focus exclusively on gaining context from
such external sources.
C. COMPARISON FINDINGS BASED ON THE
METHODOLOGICAL TAXONOMY
Table 7 illustrates the comparison of the around 50 papers we
covered in the survey according to the taxonomy of Table 6.
Works from the categories Simulation (see Section V-G) and
Privacy (see Section V-H) are not under comparison here.
In the first column, the methods and technologies used, and
in the last column, the areas of application, the publications
diverge widely, as already revealed in the detailed descrip-
tions in Section V. The only exception is automotive security,
where several papers combine intrusion detection systems
with context-awareness.
However, it is particularly striking that in the area of
automotive and fleet security, only two of the papers ana-
lyzed take a generic approach and only two others could be
applied at least to some extent to a broader field of appli-
cation (second column). In other areas, such as IT security
and SIEMs, generic applicability is much more pronounced.
The third column (modeling) shows a clear picture: either
ontologies (On) are used, or no model is defined at all (-),
but only superficially a set of relevant contextual information
is mentioned. A few papers that at least exhaustively define
the space of contextual information used in their work can be
roughly classified into key-value approaches (K/-), without
following stringent notations. Two publications stand out,
which use a markup-based approach [101] and an object-
oriented model [120], [121].
In the fourth category of comparison, the reasoning
methods, most of the publications work either with a
semi-supervised or rule-based approach. Most rule-based
approaches are employed in combination with ontologies
and implemented in the form of Semantic Web tech-
nologies such as OWL and SWRL. This follows the
traditional approach from the context-awareness literature.
Semi-supervised approaches, in contrast, tend to be used
without an actual model. The popularity of this category of
machine learning methods is deeply rooted in the underlying
problem. In the security field, it is characteristic that quite
a high amount of data of normal, inconspicuous behavior is
available, while data with real failures, attacks, and intrusions
is rare and, above all, not made public. Training of pure
supervised classification methods is difficult in this case. It is
worth noting that only a few publications combine rule-based
approaches and other methods. Supervised methods have
been used where labeled data is available, such as in the
extraction of context from a text (e.g. [140]).
Although publications like to argue with the reuse of
knowledge when selecting ontologies as a modeling method,
only a few of the publications analyzed here basically follow
this approach themselves. Only five of the papers make data,
ontologies, or implementation freely available online. Partic-
ularly positive here are the works [101], which provide both
code and simulation environment, and [145], which offer a
publicly accessible database including query interface.
D. COMPARISON FINDINGS BASED ON THE TAXONOMY
OF CONTEXT INFORMATION CATEGORIES
In table Table 8, the individual works are classified regarding
the included context information. A filled circle indicates a
particularly extensive or detailed consideration of the cate-
gory. Unfilled circles indicate that the publication is based on
information in this area, but has either not elaborated on it
in detail, does not describe how and from where the context
information is obtained, or only covers a very selected subset
of the category. For example, if only the category ’behavior’
is mentioned, but no more detail is given on which behaviors
to differentiate, this is marked with an unfilled circle.
Overall, it is evident that no publication covers all areas
of context information. This is understandable concerning
the use of the information considered. Since some context
information is more relevant in the vehicle, it was there-
fore considered more in publications on dedicated security
measures. In contrast, others are more relevant in SIEM are
more relevant in SIEM systems for correlation. Papers in
the area of automotive context and data aggregation do not
aim to increase security and, as expected, have low cov-
erage of directly security-related categories such as alerts,
vulnerabilities, and security status. Publications in the field of
IT-SIEM systems, on the other hand, do not consider physical
aspects relevant to our use case or information related to
the non-virtual world. Attack descriptions sometimes contain
information about attacker groups that typically use the attack
method. However, such information has not been categorized
by us as ’user’ because it is not legitimate system users, but
merely information related to the attack.
Some expected correlation between the analysis results in
this section and the previous one can be noted. Works that do
not define an explicit context model or only minimal lists of
considered information (see Table 7) rarely achieve broad and
detailed covered categories in Table 8. However, individual
context aspects are described in detail in such works and
methodically extracted from data. Furthermore, due to space
limitations in publications, it is challenging to describe all
categories of context information with the methods used to
derive them fromdatawhen several categories are considered.
In the application area fleet security, almost only super-
ficial information of companies has been considered so far.
Accordingly, in this category, few contextual information
has been elaborated in detail, but only categories have been
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TABLE 7. Summary of literature reviewed in this survey.
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mentioned. The work [90] is the only example in this category
that goes into more detail. In contrast, in the area of vehicle
security, there is a strong focus on behavior and, in some
cases, on the context of the legacy CAN network. Here,
in particular, the work goes into methodological detail about
how data becomes context. An exception to this is [93], which
takes a more theoretical approach but describes a broader
coverage of categories. In the overview, it is noticeable that
publications from the automotive security area do not yet
cover the breadth and/or depth of information as is the case
in IT.
In the area of automotive context-awareness and data
aggregation, the picture is very uneven, since the works pur-
sue very different application areas. However, they all have
vehicle behavior in common to varying degrees of depth and
sophistication. As far as the other categories in the table to
the left of this are concerned, context-awareness of location
and environment, for example, is vital for (autonomous) driv-
ing functions and is, therefore, more common. Some works
also include external context here, such as data from other
vehicles.
The context category network is particularly strongly rep-
resented in the application area of IT Security. It is interesting
to see that certain papers from IT security also include envi-
ronmental contexts. These are works in the field of mobile
IT security. This manifests a difference from conventional
network security, which does not focus on such a context.
Compared to the publications in automotive security, there are
conventional IT security publications that already integrate
vulnerabilities or alarms as context.
Work in the field of SIEM and alert correlation provides
a very homogeneous picture. Here, the external information
is particularly strongly represented, the context information
typically referred to as threat intelligence. However, the exter-
nal context used in the area of SIEM and correlation is
primarily to be seen as a data source for the other cate-
gories, such as vulnerabilities and attacks. For example, [144]
focus just on the extraction of context from external sources.
Especially the field of vulnerabilities and configuration is
heavily used as context by the work in the SIEM environment.
The publications considered here already go into a depth
that fuels the actual usability of contextual information in
practice. Network information, on the other hand, plays only
a subordinate role.
Finally, the last area examined, industrial and IoT security
presents a scattered picture. Overall, there is an increased
focus on these cyber-physical systems’ physical aspects, sim-
ilar to the automotive environment. However, unlike the pub-
lications in automotive security, for example, [150] already
goes into a detailed consideration of alert, vulnerability, and
configuration contexts.
E. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Several things can be concluded from the current state of
science and research. Overall, the following points lead to the
conclusion that context-awareness in the automotive security
environment is still very much in its infancy.
1) IMMATURITY IN USING A CONTEXT MODEL
The most important and essential question is ’what is the
context’, or ’in which context’. Research in the field of
context-awareness in automotive security has only rarely used
a modeling methodology. Context is thus not or only insuffi-
ciently defined. Progress in all areas of context-awareness can
be expected when complete models allow an actual compar-
ison of the used contexts of two systems.
2) IMMATURITY IN USING THE RIGHT MODELING METHODS
In application areas outside the automotive industry, ontolo-
gies have become strongly established to model context.
In the SIEM environment, this has given rise to knowledge
graphs, which are very well suited to the big data challenges
and the integration of external knowledge. However, it is still
an open question which modeling methodology is suitable
for the real-time critical applications in the vehicle or the
analyses of the fleet.
3) IMMATURITY OF UTILIZED CATEGORIES AND ASPECTS OF
CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
As can be seen in the publications of the other industries
and application areas, the contexts considered are differing
greatly. In general, however, there is a much broader and in
some places deeper coverage of context categories than in
the automotive security domain. When context models for
vehicle and fleet security are defined in the future, care should
be taken to take this breadth into account.
4) IMMATURITY OF THE INFERENCE METHODOLOGY
In the future, special attention should be paid to the improved
inference of the current context from the given data. So far,
strong separation of rule-based methods tied to ontologies
and machine learning-based methods that do not feed into
explicit context models can be observed in the literature, inde-
pendent of the application area. Combinations of different
approaches have not been pursued widely, while machine
learning is gaining importance in the literature due to increas-
ing data volumes. But of course, we have to keep it with
Occam’s Razor24: Of several satisfactory solutions to the
same problem, the simplest theory is preferable. Thus, use
machine learning where required but stick to more straight-
forward, hand-crafted rules where sufficient.
5) IMMATURITY OF APPLICABILITY
Context-awareness and semantic description forms of data
originate from science. The more widespread use of Knowl-
edge Graphs in the industry (e.g. [134]) or at least industrial
research [169] finally shows the applicability of these ideas.
However, many projects on ontologies or other forms of
context description have remained dry theory and have never
24https://www.britannica.com/topic/Occams-razor
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been able to prove in practice their usefulness. Work on auto-
motive security context-awareness should always seek prac-
tical relevance (how can the modeled knowledge be applied)
not to die virtuously. Practical usability includes validation
of context-awareness, which can only be done within defined
use cases. Different contexts may be relevant for different
use cases (different vehicle architectures, functions, context
users).
6) IMMATURITY OF REUSE
The previous two sections have shown that methods have
already been identified for various context aspects to derive
them from the vehicle and network data. Likewise, extensive
context models have already been developed for security
applications and the vehicle context. Thus, it is unnecessary to
reinvent the wheel for automotive security context-awareness
but to combine the existing state of the art.
In summary, these challenges form the research gaps that
need to be filled. The first step in this direction can be to
combine the context models for security and the vehicle
domain known in the literature in a meaningful way to obtain
initial substantive definitions of the vehicle and the fleet
security context. An open dialog with industry and academia
is needed to identify relevant categories of information in
this effort. Methods to refine the context information used
based on validation in real-world applications are also open
research areas. In this paper, we present some use cases in
the security domain at the beginning. With the increasing
availability of data from vehicle fleets, the enterprise itself,
and the ecosystem, other sub-fields of security may benefit
from a semantic description of data in the future that we
cannot yet imagine today.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The development of security measures such as encryption,
intrusion detection, firewalls, or monitoring and correlation
systems such as SIEMs is becoming increasingly urgent for
the automotive industry. The introduction of legal regula-
tions and the high risks for the safety of passengers and the
immense financial impact of attacks have led to increased
investments in the industry and many publications in this
field. However, the vehicle’s current security measures are
designed too statically to deal with the constantly chang-
ing threat situation. At the same time, in the backend of
the vehicle manufacturer or a third-party vendor, where the
security alarms accumulate in the Security Operations Center,
human analysts are faced with a pile of data from which no
decisions can be easily deduced. Thereby, both in the vehi-
cle and in the backend, it requires context information and
context-sensitivity to better deal with the myriad challenges.
Overall, we would like to point out that we are still at the
very beginning of the rather vague topic of context-awareness
for security. But if we look ahead to the future, opening up
vehicles to (authorized) access from outside is indispensable
for new vehicle functions and the creation of value in the
automotive industry. We therefore already need to start think-
ing about the future vehicle and fleet security. In addition
to established development processes, a structured test strat-
egy, rapid fleet-wide updates, and comprehensivemonitoring,
context-awareness can become an important component of
security concepts.
This work thus serves to develop adaptive, intelligent secu-
rity measures that adapt to the context of the vehicle and
fleet. Our work makes a valuable contribution by defining
context for vehicle and fleet security as well as character-
izing challenges for which context information is necessary.
We identified
• unlimited situation diversity,
• new vulnerabilities continuously,
• architectural complexity (ECUs, lines of code) and
dynamics,
• cost constraints,
• enormous amounts of data,
• and diversity of variants
as the six key challenges. Some examples were given on
the use of contextual information for security. In addition,
we have outlined the main characteristics of context infor-
mation and presented the established methods for context
modeling.
The main contribution is a comprehensive survey
conducted by identifying and summarizing work on
context-awareness from the areas of vehicle onboard and
fleet security, vehicle data, IT security and SIEM systems,
and industrial security. The subsequent comparison of the
considered publications revealed some open research areas
and is intended to be a guidance for the future development
of intelligent security in the automotive domain. A taxonomy
of relevant categories of contextual information was estab-
lished based on the comparison of the analyzed papers. The
quintessence of the comparison is that the solutions currently
published under the goal of context-awareness in the vehicle
security domain are not yet genuinely context-aware. Neither
do the current works reach the breadth of categories that the
taxonomy spans, nor is it sufficiently clear for all aspects
of context how it can be extracted from the amount and
variety of data in the vehicle. However, the analysis also
shows that substantial preliminary work has already been
done in application areas outside of security as well as in
other industries. This is where we can start in the future to
improve security measures for vehicles and fleets and make
them more intelligent.
Necessary steps for this have already been presented in
the previous section of this paper. We hope that our survey
will make it easier for successive work to get started on the
topic of context-awareness, adaptivity, and intelligence for
security measures. Other topics that should be focused on for
the development of such measures in the future are privacy
approaches as well as datasets and their generation utiliz-
ing simulations, and the reproducible generation of attacks
to enable meaningful validation. In the future, we plan to
develop explicit context models for the vehicle security field
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to achieve a fine-grained definition of the relevant context.
Apart from that, it is necessary to extend the interfaces to
security measures such as intrusion detection systems, access
controls, and SIEM systems to enable the use of context
information. Last but not least, more use cases for context
information should be explored to gain the maximum benefit
from the effort of semantically describing data from vehicles
and fleets in the future. Another aspect that was outside the
scope of this work is securing context information. When the
context is used to control other security measures, it itself
becomes an asset worth protecting.
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